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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U ta_h
I

H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE
NALDER, H. WILLIAM NALDER, JF...

I

Plaintiffs and
Respondents}
vs.

Case No. 8529

KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rule 75 (p) ( 2) specifies that the appellants' brief shall
contain a concise statement of the facts of the case. It is submitted that the defendants' statement of facts is not concise,
nor is it objective. Rather, it is, in many instances, misleading
and argumentative. Attempts will not be made at this point
to refute defendant's statement of facts. However, a brief
reference to a deliberate attempt on the part of the defendani
to belittle the plaintiffs must be mentioned.
Repeatedly in the sixteen pages of the statement of facts
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the defendant makes derogatory remarks concerning the plaintiffs, such as: ((Irregularities were discovered in their dealings,"
page 7; (('Mortgaged turkeys which had been wrongfully
delivered to a service station operator," page 9; ((Involvement
in litigation and poor paying record," page 10; ((could not
secure financing from other sources," pages 11 and 12; ((bad
credit rating and pending litigation," page 12; "lack of character and poor reputation," page 12; ((false and incomplete
credit information," page 13; ((confessed themselves as failures,'' page 7; and ((written confession of their wrongdoings,"
page 8. Such statements are not accurate, are taken out of context, and are used only to emphasize the defendant's version
of the testimony. No mention was made of the numerous
reports \\'herein the plaintiffs \\·ere characterized as good turkey
raisers having a good reputation, and instances where persons,
relying upon the integrity of the plaintiffs, were willing to cosign on their obligations to enable them to secure turkey
financing. Certainly such repeated repetition of this aspect of
the case was only intended to emphasize part of the evidence
and prejudice the court. It cannot be said to be part of a brief,
concise and objective statement of facts, advising the court
of the litigation.
In other instances the defendant makes statements consistent only with his theory of the facts, such as the importance
of unreleased mortgages to the effect that the amount owing
was the important factor, not the fact that they \vere unreleased.
However, the record is clear that as to unreleased turkey chattel
mortgages, no large feed company would advance financing
until those tnortgages were released, since they purported to
gtve a lien on after acquired turkeys (Tr. 120, 358, 382-3).
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A similar statement is, ((The record is bare of any evidence
that any demand was ever made for a release of the real estate
mortgages." This again is seriously disputed, as will be shown
in the balance of the brief.
The lengthy statement of facts is resplendent with argumentative statements. In fact, the normal statement of facts
ends at the top of page 6, and continually thereafter, through
page sixteen, the defendant proceeds to make statements concerning the facts and argue the same. Such argumentative statements involve the following:
Discussion concerning the defendants demanding double
security, page 6; authority of the defendant's agents, page 7;
the number of turkeys the plaintiffs had and would raise, page
7; threats made by the agents of the defendants concerning
turkey financing after 1951, pages 8 and 9; information contained in applications made by the plaintiffs to Ralston-Purina,
page 13; language of the mortgages, page 14; no demands
having been made for release of the~_.mortgages, page 14; the
policy of the company and whether it acted in good faith,
page 15. None of these involve a concise statement indicatiag
a disputed issue, but rather they contain the theory and arguments of the defendants. The case was tried before a jury. The
plaintiff throughout the case and in his argument stressed his
theory and the facts. The jury has determined those factual
issues on competent evidence against the defendant.
>o!,

The plaintiffs submit the following statment of facts:
During the years 1949, 1950 and 1951, to facilitate the
raising of turkeys by the plaintiffs and the sale of the products
of the defendant, the following chattel and real estate mortgages were executed and recorded:
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Chattel Mortgages
Exhibit A-1, March 9, 1949 ------------------------$24,000.00
Exhibit A-2, January 22, 1950 -------------------- 23,300.00
Exhibit A-3, March 26, 1951 -------------------- 42,825.00
Real Estate Mortgages
Exhibit A-7, September 14, 1949 ________________ 4,000.00
Exhibit f\i.-8, April 1, 1950 ____ :_____________________ 6, 721.80
Exhibit A-10, August 15, 1950 __________________ 6,555.12
$107,401.92
During 1948 and the first part of 1949, the plaintiffs invested approximately $20,000.00 in building a brooder house,
purchasing necessary equipment, etc., in contemplation of going into the turkey business (Tr. 308).
Prior to 1949, the plaintiffs had brooded turkeys for others.
The first year that plaintiffs raised turkeys financed by defendant was 1949. Plaintiffs maintained that they were required by defendants to let the dealer of the defendant dispose
of the turkeys financed by Kellogg, which resulted in considerable freight and storage charges. If the plaintiffs had
been permitted to sell the turkeys, as they desired, they would
have paid the 1949 account in full and would have received
approximately $800.00 (Tr. 65, 69, Ex. D-4). Due to a combination of the freight and storage charges, a depressed market,
and 29,000 pounds of turkeys allegedly becoming green
struck (Tr. 217) because of improper transporting or storing
of turkeys, the plaintiffs were only able to repay $17,891.24
of the $23,518.63 advanced by the defendant.
In 1950 and 1951 the plaintiffs were able to repay the
an1ounts advanced on the chattel mortgages and applied a small

4
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balance from each of three years to the obligation secured
by the last real estate mortgage (Ex. E 4, 7) . To increase their
volume and thus their profits, the plaintiffs had rented a
brooder house, leased a 900-acre ranch, (Ex. J-8, Tr. 294)
had purchased a tractor, combine and necessary equipment
for planting and raising grain for feeding turkeys and were
prepared to raise 14,000 turkeys in 1952 (Tr. 304, 306). The
defendant advised the plaintiffs that it would not finance the
plaintiffs for 1952, ( Tr. 74) so an application was not filed
with the defendant for that year. However, applications were
made to General Mills (Ex. F-1), Ralston Purina (Tr. 81),
Farmers Grain Coop (Ex. H-1), and Pillsbury (Tr. 296) by
the plaintiffs in an attempt to secure financing for raising
14,000 turkeys in 1952 (Tr. 306). All of the applications,
although recommended by the salesmen (Ex. H-1, F-1, Tr.
96, 108) were denied when sent to the credit departments.
When the first shipment consisting of 9,000 poults arrived,
financing had not yet been secured, and, therefore, only 6,000
turkeys were accepted (Tr. 82, 83). During the eight weeks
the 6,000 turkeys were being brooded, continuous efforts were
made to secure financing, without success (Tr. 207). The
turkeys were then retaken by the hatchery (Tr. 306). Thereafter an Ogden feed dealer co-signed with the plaintiffs at a
bank in Ogden, which permitted them to raise a small number
of turkeys in 1952 and again in 1953 and 1954 (Tr. 264).
Applications for financing were made in 1953 to the feed companies, but were again rejected. Repeatedly plaintiffs attempted
to learn why their applications were turned down. Finally,
early in 1954 when Mr. Boothe, the salesman for Ralston Purina,
asked them to make an application for financing, they agreed
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to, provided that if it were turned down the salesman would
tell the~ the reason. In March of 1954 the plaintiffs were
told that their application had been turned down because
of unreleased mortgages (Tr. 268, 241), amounting to $107,000.00. At the time of the first trial the real estate mortgages
had not been released, and the chattel mortgages were only
released as a result of this lawsuit.
The jury found that the defendant's wrongful failure to
release the satisfied mortgages . consisting of the three chattel
mortgages and the first two real estate mortgages proximately
contributed to the damage of the plaintiff. Damages were
computed upon the cost, expense, sales price, mortality rate
and average profit per turkey determined from the number of
turkeys actually raised and applied to the number of turkeys
the jury determined would have been raised.
Since the argument of the case will require a detailed
review of the evidence, additional factual matters will be
referred to hereinafter. To better enable the court to understand the evidence, most of '"hich is documentary, some of the
exhibits are presented as an appendix to this brief.
The brief of the defendant lists eleven points, some of
which only incorporate arguments contained under other points.
Upon analysis, it appears the eleven points will fall into the
usual categories of liability~ proximate cause, damages and
alleged errors at the time of the trial. Consequently, the plaintiffs shall ans\ver the arguments in that order, with a crossreference to the points urged by the defendant.

6
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE: LIABILITY
The Jury Found the Defendant Liable for Failing to Release Mortgages
(a) All of the Chattel Mortgages Should Have Been Released (Defendant's Point III)
1. 1949 Chattel Mortgages
2. 1950 Chattel Mortgages
3. 1951 Chattel Mortgages
4. Demand for an additional $352 for 1951
(b) The First Two Real Estate Mortgages Should Have
Been Released (Defendant's Point II)
(c) Demand was Duly Made for Release of Mortgages
(Defendant's Points IV and V)
(d) The Defendant Did Not Act in Good Faith in Failing
to Release the Mortgages (Defendant's Point VII)
(e) Agents of the Defendant Had Either Actual or Apparent Authority to Represent the Defendant (Defendant's Point VIII)
POINT TWO: PROXIMATE CAUSE
The Jury Properly Found that the Defendant's Failure to
Release the Mortgages was the Proximate Cause of Plaintiff's Damage (Defendant's Point VI)
POINT THREE: DAMAGES
The Law and Evidence Sustain the Jury's Determination of
Damages (Defendant's Point IV)
POINT FOUR: THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT
H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. WERE PARTNERS
AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH OF
THEIR NAMES IS PROPER (Defendant's Points I and III (d)
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POINT FIVE: THE COURT PROPERLY:
(a) Received in Evidence Exhibits I-~' I-2, Q, R, & N
1-4 (Defendant's Point V)
(b) Denied Defendant's Motions for Directed Verdict
'
Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, or for New Trial
(Defendant's Point IX)
(c) Instructed the Jury and Refused Certain of Defendant's Requested Instructions (Defendant's Point X)
(d) Disallowed Items of Defendant's Cost Bill on Appeal
(Defendant's Point XI)
CROSS-APPEAL
POINT SIX: THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE
JURY SHOULD BE DOUBLED PURSUANT TO SECTION
57-3-8 UCA 1953
POINT SEVEN: THE COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED ATTORNEYS' FEES ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE. LIABILITY
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANT
LIABLE FOR FAILING TO RELEASE MORTGAGES.
(a) ALL OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGES SHOULD
HAVE BEEN R E L EASE D. (DEFENDANT'S
POINT III).
1. 1949 CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
It is the contention of the Plaintiffs that the 1949 chattel
mortgage was to be released in consideration of the Plaintiffs'
executing the final real estate mortgage in August of 1950.
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The Defendant contended there was no such understanding.
The jury found this disputed factual issue in favor of the Plaintiffs. The facts leading up to the execution of the mortgage
in August of 1950 will show the Defendant anticipated the
deficit; requested a title search on the Plaintiffs' real property;
prepared notes and mortgages in the exact amount of the deficit
immediately after the deficit was determined; and instructed
their local sales representative to secure the execution of the
same. The sales representative secured the necessary signatures
upon the representation that the new note and mortgage would
take care of or pay the 1949 loss. More particularly, the facts
are as follows:
On March 22, 1950, after it was known that the 1949 crop
of turkeys was being held in storage, a letter was written from
the Credit Department of Kellogg Company to a Mr. George
Vogel of the Omaha plant in which it was stated as follows:
((We probably should have a real estate mortgage
search made on this man to know who is holding the
mortgage against his land, because there is going to be
a deficit on the 1949 contract and we may want to get
more security later on." (Ex. C-3, App. 2).
After the entire proceeds of the 1949 crop consisting of
$17,891.24 was paid to the Kellogg Company, the following
letter was written by a representative of Defendant, M. Schinker
to Mr. R. M. Scoville, the sales representative of the Defendant
at Salt Lake City, Utah, dated July 28, 1950:
CCWe have received a check on H. W. Nalder & Sons
account in the amount of $17,891.24, to apply against
their 1949 turkey account. This leaves a balance of
$5,627.39 principal and interest of $927.73 to date.
We are attaching notes on these two amounts and will
appreciate it if you will obtain the signatures as we
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have a 1950 contract with these people and will hope
to obtain this money at the time they sell their 1950
birds." (Ex. C 5, App. 4).
On August 2, a letter was written to Mr. S. J. Quinney
of Salt Lake City by Mr. W. H. Williams Jr., General Sales
Manager, Omaha Plant of the Kellogg Company. After referring to a request for additional financing, mention was made
of the 1949 deficit in the amount as quoted above, and Mr.
Quinney was advised that notes securing those amounts were
being sent to l'Jr. Scoville. It was suggested that a new mortgage also be secured. lvfr. Quinney v~-as advised of Mr. Scoville's
address and \vas asked to contact him for the purpose of having
the documents picked up and the signatures obtained thereon.
In the letter it was stated as follows:
((We are securing notes to cover these hvo items, but
of course are depending on the second mortgage ·which
we hold on Mr. N alder's home place as security to
cover the indebtedness." (Ex. 7-5, App. 5).
During the first part of August Mrs. N alder testified she
had a conversation with Mr. Scoville regarding the execution
of the real estate mortgage on their home. Mrs. Nalder testified as follows:
A. He asked us if \ve would sign another mortgage and
I told him: nNo". I said: ({You have more now on
there than \Ye owe Kellogg Company" and he said:
nWell, Mrs. Nalder," he said, HI£ you will sign
this, this is \Yhat you now owe Kellogg, and if you
will sign this one, we \Yill release all the others
including the chattel mortgage for '49." * * * *
(Tr. 215. Also see testimony of Mr. Nalder to the
same effect: Tr. 61-62). No witness was called by
the Defendant to refute the foregoing testimony.
The Defendant either assumed that the 1949 chattel mort-
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gage was released or should have been released and apparently
was not relying upon it for an additional amount as a claim
en after acquired property. In making a demand for $352.00,
which will be discussed in detail hereinafter, the demand was
specifically made with reference to the 1951 chattel mortgage
(T. 205). Likewise, in January, 1954, in a letter to Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker from Mr. W. H. Williams, Jr., General
Manager of the Omaha plant, it was stated as follows:
C(We are relying entirely on our real estate mortgage
and for that reason, at this moment can release all the
chattel mortgages which are unreleased at this time."
(Ex. D-24, App. 26) .
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Company, 99 Ut. 298, 105
P 2d 342, the court defined satisfaction of a mortgage as follows:
etA mortgage (has been satisfied' when it has been
terminated and the contract on which it was based has
been rescinded * * * full satisfaction rna y be received
in other modes than by payment of money' (Citation
of authorities.)
(Satisfaction' in legal phraseology (Imports a release and discharge of the obligation in reference to
which it is given.' (Citation of authority.) (To satisfy'
means (to answer or discharge, as a claim, debt, legal
demand or the like.' (Citation of authority) * * * *
The consideration for the mortgage having failed, the
same was terminated and this termination satisfied
(the mortgage'. (The holder of a mortgage renders himself liable for the statutory penalty for refusing to
release a mortgage upon sufficient tender, although he
claims that the tender is insufficient * * * ' "
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 2 fully
concerning the theories of the parties regarding the release
of the 1949 chattel mortgage. In Instruction No. 14 the Court
ct
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instructed the jury concerning satisfaction of mortgages as set
out in the preceding quotation from the Swaner case. The
factual issue was therefore squarely and properly placed before
the jury. The jury found in favor of the Plaintiffs and such
finding must be sustained since it is clearly supported by competent evidence.
The turkeys and feed, purchased v~ith money advanced
by Kellogg, were the chattels secured by the chattel mortgage
of 1949. When the feed had been consumed and the turkeys
sold, it was obvious there was no longer any security upon
which the chattel mortgage could be operative. Having this fact
in mind, even before the deficit vv-as determined, Kellogg became interested in determining the status of the title on the
real property. Just one day after the amount was received
from the sale of the 1949 crops, notes were prepared to evidence
the amount of the deficit, and four days later a letter was
written to counsel in Salt Lake City, requesting that a mortgage
be prepared to secure this deficit. Thereafter the salesman
was sent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nalder to secure its
execution. In order to secure its execution, he represented that
the other mortgages would be released. Subsequent events on
the part of the Defendant's company indicate that they did
not rely upon the chattel mortgage for any additional payments but relied completely upon the real estate mortgage.
Under such facts, it is clear that the jury's determination that
the 1949 chattel mortgage should have been released, after
execution of the real estate mortgage in August of 1950, is
clearly supported by competent evidence.
2. 1950 CHATTEL MORTGAGE

The terms of the chattel mortgages specify as follows:
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"Provided, that if the mortgagor shall pay, or cause
to be paid, unto Kellogg Sales Company, or its assigns,
the indebtedness above set forth, * * * then this instrument shall be void, and otherwise in full force and
effect." (Ex. A 1-3).
The ledger sheet, Exhibit E-4, shows that the amounts
advanced for 1950 were paid in December of 1950, and that
$1,010.88 was transferred to the 1949 deficiency. A letter
dated December 8, 1950, to H. Wm. Nalder, Jr. from M.
Schinker of Kellogg Sales Company Credit Department, confirms payment in full for the 1950 advances. Under such circumstances, it cannot be serious maintained that there was not
a duty to release that chattel mortgage.
3. 1951 CHATTEL MORTGAGE
The same type of chattel mortgage was involved here as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which provides if the
indebtedness is paid in full, the mortgage shall be void. Here
again, the amount was paid in full as disclosed by the Defendant's own ledger sheets (Ex. E-5). The last sheet is marked
paid on January 29, 1952, and shows $493_.31 was transferred
to the 1949 deficit. A letter, (Ex. D-13, App. 13) dated January 30, 1952 to Mr. Nalder, Sr. and Jr. from Kellogg Sales
Company, acknowledged receipt of the final payment for 1951
and stated that they had applied $326.44 to principal, $447.69
to interest, and the balance of $493.31 to the 1949 account.
Again, it cannot be maintained that the 1951 mortgage should
not have been released since it was paid in full.
The defendant under Point III (b) alleges that the trial
court committed error in permitting the jury to award damages
against the defendant for failure to release chattel mortgages
because each chattel mortgage secured the prior unpaid debt
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of Plaintiffs, H. William Nalder, Sr., and Jr., which was not
paid, hence no release could be demanded.
To support this contention, the Defendant quotes from
the chattel mortgages. The quotation does not support the
assertion made, and is quoted out of context. In addition, the
Defendant deleted part of the section quoted and failed to
quote the balance of the sentence which clearly showed that
the mortgage was restricted to future advances pertaining to
the particular crop of turkeys then being financed.
In context, the chattel mortgage after naming the mortgagor sets out the consideration clause as follows:
(·for and in consideration of a sum estimated at
$23,300.00 advanced or to be advanced for the purchase
of turkeys, turkey poults, turkey feed, grain, insurance
premiums, miscellaneous supplies * * * "
The personal property then being mortgaged is described
as all of the turkeys and turkey poults numbering approximately
6,000 located in Davis County, Utah.
The complete section from which the Defendant quoted
and on which he was relying is as follows: (the part emphasized
by the Defendant is italicized and the part deleted and omitted
by Defendant is underlined) :
nProvided that if the mortgagor shall pay or cause
to be paid unto Kellogg Sales Company or its assi~s
the indebtedness above set forth on demand as evidenced by his note or notes, together with interest as
therein provided and shall further pay or cause to be
paid such other further and future indebtedness
whether evidenced by promissory note or not as th~
mortgagor may hereafter incur to the n1ortgagee, rt

being the intent he1·eof to secut"e the said mortgagee
any advance or rredit now made or hereafter nzade
for the purchase of turkey poults, prepared turkey
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feed and small grain, or any other advancements or
credits extended in con'nection with the feeding, shelter,
insurance and proper handling of said turkeys to maturity or for market, * * * together with interest, if
any, and shall fully and punctually perform all the
covenants and agreements hereon contained to be kept
and performed by the mortgagor, then this instrument
shall be void, otherwise in full force and effect.
The quotation refers to ((indebtedness above set forth"
and ttsuch other further and future indebtedness." There is
no reference to any existing or prior indebtedness.
The material quoted by defendant does not sustain its
contention that:
ttThus by the very terms of these chattel mortgages,
they were given to secure the existing indebtedness no
matter how originating." (Defendant's brief, Page 27).
The mortgages do purport to secure future advancements
but those advancements are limited to funds extended in connection with the raising of said turkeys to maturity.
The provision clearly stated that upon payment of the
indebtedness the chattel mortgage shall be void. The mortgages do not purport to secure past indebtedness or future
indebtedness involving a different crop of turkeys in a subsequent year.
In Bank of Searcy v. Kroh, 114 S.W. 2nd 26, 194 Ark.
785, the mortgage involved specified:
((It is also understood and agreed that the foregoing
conveyance shall stand as security for the payment of
any extension or renewals * * * ; also as security for
the payment of any liability or liabilities of grantor
already or hereafter contracted * * * (Emphasis added.)
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In spite of the language of the mortgage, the Court stated
as follows:
tWhen a mortgage is given to secure a specific debt
named, the security will not be extended as to an antecedent debts unless the instrument so provides and identifies those intended to be secured in clear terms andJ
to be extended to cover debts subsequently incurred,
these must be of the same class and so related to the
pr!mary _debt secured that the assent of th·e mortgagor
wtll be tnferred. The reason is that mortgages, by the
use of general terms, ought never to be so extended
as to secure debts which the debtor did not contemplate.
It would be an easy matter to describe the nature and
character of the debt so that the debtor and third parties
may be fully advised as to the extent of the mortgage."
(Emphasis added.)
4. DEMAND FOR AN ADDITIONAL $352.00 FOR
c

1951
The Defendant maintains it was willing to subordinate its
mortgages provided an additional $352 was paid for 1951.
Further, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs illegally sold
and failed to account for turkeys in 1951. To determine if the
Defendant rightly insisted upon the $352 payment and the
validity of the other assertions requires a detailed review of
the evidence. At the time the 1951 crop of turkeys was being
processed, the Plaintiffs were offered approxin1ately 25 cents
per pound for the nC" grade turkeys (Tr. 66). They, therefore,
took the turkeys from the processing plant and disposed of
them personally and through the Economy Market at Ogden,
for 38 cents a pound (T. 67). After taking them from the
processing plant, they were advised they should not have done
so without permission from Kellogg. Consequently, the day
after the turkeys were taken, Mrs. Nalder wrote a letter to
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Kellogg advising them fully of what had taken place and the
reason for taking the turkeys from the processing plant (Tr.
67, 146).
Although the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs illegally
and wrongfully sold said nc grade turkeys," Mr. Williams,
the Defendant's head representative, testified as follows:

Q. I believe you stated that the grower rna y make his
own arrangements for the sale of the turkeys?
A. That is right.
Q. Well, then, the Nalders did have the authority to
remove the turkeys from Lee Brown's plant, HC"
grade turkeys, and make other arrangements for
sale of them, did they not ?
A. That's true. (Tr. 465 and 466).
Nevertheless, Mr. Williams told the Plaintiffs that the
sale of the nC" turkeys was a penitentiary offense (Tr. 73,
222) and a demand was made for the 315 ((C" grade turkeys
at the rate of 42 cents per pound for the hens and 38 cents
a pound for the toms, amounting to $2,130.06 (Ex. D-10, Tr.
45 3). This price was recognized to be higher than the amount
which could have been secured for sale of the turkeys as nC"
grade turkeys (Tr. 453).
Mr. Nalder made arrangements to borrow $1,250.00 and
on January 21, 1950, sent the same to Kellogg Company (Ex.
D-12). On January 30, 1952, a check for losses covered by
insurance on the turkeys in the sum of $1,267.55 was received by Kellogg, thus paying the 1951 account in full, plus
t~. balance which was applied on the 1949 account. After receiving this latter check, Kellogg wrote to the Nalders as
follows:
((We wish to acknowledge receipt of the insurance
adjustment in the amount of $1,267.44 which we have
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credited to your 1951 turkey account, the 1951 interest,
and we have credited the balance of $493.31 to you,.
old account. The outstanding principal on the 1951
account was $326.44 and the interest amounted to
$447.69. {Ex. D-13) (App. 13).
In spite of the fact that in the preceding letter, the 1951
account had been paid in full and a balance of $493.31 was
credited to the old account, they still insisted in the same
letter than an additional $352 be paid on said etC" grade
turkeys.
On February 2, 1952, William Nalder, Jr. wrote to Mr.
W. H. Williams, Sales Manager of Kellogg Company, Omaha,
Nebraska, and mentioned that he had been informed by his
father that Kellogg would not be financing them in 1952, and
stated that arrangements had been made with another company
for financing, provided they would be assured of a first lien
to the extent of their advances. The Kellogg Company was
advised that turkeys had been ordered and \Yere expected to
arrive during the first week of March (Ex. D-14, App. 14).
Upon receipt of that letter, an interoffice communication
was sent from W. L. Aust, the Credit Manager of Kellogg
Sales, to Mr. Williams, Plant Manager of the Omaha plant.
The memorandum stated as follows:
Attached is a copy of a letter received from Bill Nalder, Jr. I \YOuld like to tell him that we \Yill have to have
the $352.00 for 1951 turkeys 'vhich he traded for the gas
bill before \ve could agree to \Yrite such a letter. What
do you think? I doubt that he can pay this but it might
tl'ork.·'' (Ex. D-15, App. 15). (Emphasis added.)
On February 18, 1952, Mr. Aust replied to Mr. Nalder's
letter of February 2 and stated that a subordination agreement
could not be granted until the $352 was paid.
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Even though Mr. Aust, the Credit Manager, realized that
the Nalders had received practically nothing from the raising
of turkeys for three years, and that they vvere unable to raise
$352, yet the Defendant insisted upon that payment, claiming
that it was due for 1951. However, their letter and their ledger
sheet discloses that the '51 balance was paid in full. Mr. Aust
stated in his testimony that he was demanding the $352 as
being owed on the 1951 obligation and not claiming it by
virtue of the deficit for the 1949 chattel mortgage (Tr. 377-8).
Since Mr. Nalder did not advise Kellogg of the company
with whom they were dealing, as requested in the letter dated
February 18, 1952, Kellogg Sales Company wrote the following
letter dated February 26, 1952, to Farmers' Grain Company
and apparently sent a copy of the letter to General Mills (T.
129). The letter was as follows:
((Gentlemen: We have recently had a request from
Mr. H. William Nalder, Jr. to subordinate our lien
which we have on his 1951 flock of turkeys. We have
written to Mr. Nalder and notified him that upon receipt
of his remittance of $352.00 we would agree to furnish
a subordination agreement to cover the remaining balance for prior years, but we must have the 1951 account
cleaned up. We also have asked Mr. Nalder the name
of the feed company willing to finance him this season,
but we have not received a reply to our letter.
((We understand that you folks are contemplating
financing his 1952 turkey program and we wish to
notify you at this time that we still have a lien on his
turkeys. If you have any further questions on this we
would appreciate having you contact us." (Emphasis
added.) (Ex. F-10, App. 17).
After the first shipment of 9,000 poults arrived and financing had not been approved, Mr. H. William Nalder, Jr. on
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March 2, 1952, sent the following telegram to Kellogg Sales
Company:
''~ alked Lee Brown, taking processing agreement,

sendtng you $352.00. Said would but now says can't
do for 60 days. My turkeys arrived 26th March (sic.
February). Got one ton feed, can't get more till General
Mills, 0 gden, Utah, Mr. Henry Stevens, receives subordination. Can you send subordination to General
Mills. Wire if possible and receive submittance Brown
60 days? My only possible way of raising it." (Ex. D-17,
App. 18).
In rely to that telegram, Kellogg Company wired to William N alder as follows:
C<"J'.. T

•

f..

yen secure a letter frOE1 Lee Bro\vn agreeing to pay balance of $352.00 to us by-./\.pril 15, this
year." (Ex. D-18, ./J.pp. 19).
l ~eces~ary

Attempts were made to secure the letter requested but
Mr. Brown apparently changed his mind about making payment and therefore the application with General Mills was
not granted since the subordination agreement was not issued
(Tr. 302).
After the hatchery had retaken all of the turkeys and all
of the applications had been turned down, Mr. Nalder, Sr. on
April 5, wrote to the Kellogg Company, and after mentioning
that he had been unable to send the $352.00, stated as follows:
"I have been fair and honest with your company and
in all fairness I feel you should go along with me and
help me to recover myself. I would like to put this
proposition for your consideration. I would like to have
2,000 turkeys to care for right around here. This is the
best condition I have been in. I have a lot of equipment. I want to stay in the business and not fail. I want
to succeed and pay up \vithout having to sell my home.
I have never dealt with anyone that I could not do busi-
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ness with them again. Please reconsider my. case and let
me work out and regain my losses. _Give me a chance
and I will not let you down. Please answer me back
as soon as possible. Let it be favorable." (Ex. D-19,
App. 20).
In response to that letter, Kellogg Sales Company, through
their credit manager, Mr. Aust, advised Mr. Nalder he would
still have to pay the $352 (Ex. D-20, App. 21).
Although Mr. Nalder had paid the $1,250.00 as agreed,
and in spite of the fact that the 1951 account had been paid in
full, the Defendant was insisting that Mr. N alder must pay
the $352.00 before they would issue a subordination agreement. Further demand was made for $352.00 in a letter on
August 27, 1952 (Ex. D-21, App. 22). Demand was made in
a letter on April 15, 1953, referring to the amount as ((the
balance on the 1951 turkey contract * * * Also advise us when
you will be able to pay the $352.00 to clean up the 1951 account." (Ex. D-22, App. 24).
Similar language was used in a letter demanding the
$352.00 dated June 4, 1953, wherein the balance was referred
to as the t($352.00 which is the balance due on the 1951 turkey
contract * * * . You agreed to pay this $352 balance on the
1951 account * * * ." (Ex. D-23, App. 25).
In a letter dated December 22, 1952, again demanding
payment, it was stated:
((As mentioned in our conference, on receipt of these
remittances we will be in a position to furnish you
with a subordination agreement allowing you to secure
turkey financing elsewhere, inasmuch as our mortgage
is still of record." (Ex. D 21-5, App. 23). (Emphasis
added.)
From the foregoing, the following is clearly established:
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First, the 1951 loan was paid in full as shown by the
ledger sheet of the Defendant and a letter sent to the Nalders
(Ex. E-5, D-13, App. 13).
Second, by withholding releases of the mortgage, the
Kellogg Company was attempting to coerce an additional paymenta£ $352.00.
Third, the Defendant knew that the unreleased mortgages
would prevent the Plaintiff from securing financing from other
sources (Ex. D-21-5, App. 23).
Fourth, the Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's financial
difficulties, but nevertheless flippantly insisted on the payment
because, ((It might work" (Ex. D-15, App. 15).
Fifth, the Defendant officiously wrote letters to other
feed companies claiming a lien, and stating that the 1951 account had not been paid in full, directly disputing information
in applications filed by the Plaintiffs (Ex. F-10, App. 17).
Sixth, the Plaintiff did not illegally sell or fail to account
for the 1951 turkeys, but rather advised the Defendants fully
of the sale and borrowed money and paid the 1951 account in
full.
A conditional refusal based upon an invalid condition is
still just a refusal.
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Company, supra, the mortgagee refused to release a n1ortgage even though it was unwilling to advance the money secured by the mortgage. An FHA application fee had been paid and fire insurance had been purchased to cover the proposed home. The mortgagee 'vas insisting upon being paid for those expenses before it would release the mortgage. The court, in determining that the mort-
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gagee did not have any authority to insist upon those conditions
before the mortgage was released, stated as follows:
((Appellant insists that the finding of the lower court
that appellant refused to cancel the note and mortgage
is erroneous because it specifically offered to cancel
said note and mortgage provided respondent reimbursed
it for certain expenses. We see no error in the finding.
By its very argument appellant admits that its offer to
cancel was conditional. An offer to cancel based on a
condition is in reality a refusal to cancel together with
a counter offer. If appellant had breached its contract,
as respondent alleged, it was bound to cancel the note
and n1ortgage and could not require respondent to
fulfill further conditions * * * .
((Appellants breach released respondent from the
duty and appellant was wrong in refusing to release
the mortgage in an attempt to compel payment."
It is clear from the foregoing that all of the chattel mortgages should have been released. The 1949 balance was included
in the August 1950 note and real estate mortgage. The 1950
and 1951 accounts were paid in due course and therefore the
mortgages should have been released at that time.
(B) THE FIRST TWO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED (DEFENDANT'S
POINT II).
From September 14, 1949, to August 15, 1950, three real
estate mortgages secured by the same property were issued by
Mr. and Mrs. N alder to the Defendant as follows:
September 14, 1954 ______________________ $4,000.00
April 1, 1950 ---------------------------------- 6, 721.80
August 15, 19 50 ---------------------------- 6, 55 5.12
The first mortgage was issued to secure the advance of
$2,000.00 by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. The second mort23
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gage was in connection with the increasing of the primary
loan on the home. The last mortgage was an incident of the
1949 deficit. No advances were made by Defendant on the
second mortgage. On July 27, 1950, the Defendant received
the last payment for thel949 crop and determined the deficit
(Ex. C-4, App. 3). On July 28, 1950, a promissory note and
a letter were sent to the Defendant's agent, Mr. Scoville, at
Salt Lake City, Utah (Ex. C-5, App. 4). On August 2, 1950,
~~. letter was sent to Mr. Quinney with instructions to prepare
a mortgage including the exact amount of the deficit plus a
contemplated additional financing of $3,600.00 (Ex. C 7.5,
App. 5). The conversation between Mrs. N alder and lvir.
Scoville at the time the mortgage was executed has been previously set out in this brief. In essence, Mrs. Nalder protested
signing the mortgage, but upon the assurances of Mr. Scoville
that the other mortgages would be released, consented to sign
the same (Tr. 60, 61, 215, 216). Certainly the normal inference
from such a discussion would be that the prior chattel mortgage and the two earlier real estate mortgages 'Yould be merged
in the final mortgage, being the exact amount of the deficit.
Mr. Scoville was not called as a witness to refute this testimony
concerning this conversation.
In addition to the prior decision in this case by the Supreme
Court, the following cases support the statement that a prior
mortgage rna y be satisfied by the execution of a new mortgage
if the parties so intend:
First Nat. Bank of Jackson v. Reynolds, 143 S.W. 2d 721,
283 Ky. 837.
Benton Harbor State Bank v. Bubanovich, 242 N.W. 870,
259 Mich. 150.
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Duvall v. Duncan, 111 S.W. 2d 89, 341 Mo. 1129.
Brady v. Selberg, 60 P. 2d 1104, 254 Or. 477.
Subsequent transactions on the part of the Defendant
indicate that they were relying solely upon the last real estate
mortgage as security for the 1949 deficit. In a letter to Ray,
Quinney and Nebeker from W. H. Williams, General Manager
of the Omaha Plant of the Kellogg Company, it was stated
as follows:
C<W e are relying entirely on our real estate mortgage
and for that reason can at this point release all the chattel mortgages which are unreleased at this time. We are
attaching releases for 1949, 50 and 51 chattel mortgages. * * * *
The only real estate mortgage which is of record
now1 we feel quite sure1 is the last one1 as you put it
* * * (Ex. D 24, App. 26).
It is obvious that the Defendant was of the opinion that
it had released the earlier mortgages and was relying on the
last one, as stated in the foregoing letter. In view of Mr.
Nalder's testimony, the chronological sequence of the securing
of the last mortgage which evidenced and secured the deficit
of 1949, and the quotation from the foregoing letter, the jury
was certainly justified in finding that the first two real estate
mortgages should have been released.
At no time did the Plaintiffs maintain that the August,
1950 mortgage was not properly of record. If the three chattel
mortgages and the first two real estate mortgages had been
released as maintained by the Plaintiffs, there would have
been mortgages of record totaling $15,5 55.12 consisting of
the primary mortgage, which was originally in the sum of
$9,000.00 and the second mortgage to the Defendant in the

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sum of $6,555.12. A total mortgage indebtedness of $15,555.12
secured by property valued at $35,000.00 to $45,000.00 (Ex.
G-1 and G- 5) would not have impaired the credit rating of the
plaintiffs. In contrast, the record actually showed unreleased
chattel and real estate mortgages amounting to $116,501.92 consisting of three chattel mortgages and three real estate mortgages in favor of the defendant and the primary mortgage on
the home in the amount of $9,000.00.
The Defendant in Point II urged that the court com·
mitted error in permitting the jury to award Plaintiffs damages
for failure to release the real estate mortgages because the
Plaintiffs never paid or otherwise discharged the obligations
secured by said mortgages. That there was no duty to release
any mortgages until the 1949 deficit was paid was vigorously
argued upon the prior appeal. The Supreme Court answered
such arguments as follows:
nAppellant' s final contention is that respondents
v;ere never entitled to have any of the mortgages released because the original 1949 debt, it contends,
continued during the entire financial dealings of the
parties. Such would be the case only if a merger was
not intended by the parties upon the execution of subsequent mortgages. The trial court found such a merger
to have been intended, and his finding is well supported
by the frank testimony of appellant's own witn~ss that

it u·as the final real estate Jnortgage upon whzch the
coJJl pany relied for security.','
In view of this decision, there can be no doubt but what
on the same evidence the issue was properly submitted to the
Jury.
The Legislature has specified that when mortgages have
been paid or satisfied they should be released. The jury found
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that the 1949 chattel mortgage and the first two real estate
mortgages should have been released having been merged into
the final real estate mortgage as represented by the agent of
Defendant. Even the Defendants cannot deny that the 1950
and 1951 chattel mortgages were paid in full, and therefore
should have been released.
It is submitted that there is not only sufficient competent
evidence to support the findings of the jury, but rather the
evidence compels, in the light of legislative enactments, a
determintaion that the Defendant had a duty to release the
above mentioned mortgages.
(C) DEMi\ND WAS DULY MADE FOR RELEASE OF
MORTGAGES (DEFENDANT'S POINTS IV AND V).
The two statutes pertaining to the releasing of chattel
and real estate mortgages are as follows:
Section 9-1-4 UCA, 1953 (chattel):
((After the full performance of the conditions of the
mortgage, any mortgagee, agent, assignee or legal representative, who shall willfully neglect, for the space
of ten days after being requested, to discharge the same
shall be liable to the mortgagor or his assigns in the
sum of $50 punitive damages and also for actual damages sustained by such neglect or refusal."
Section 57-3-8 UCA, 1953 (Real Estate)
((If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release any
mortgage after the same has been fully satisfied, he
shall be liable to the mortgagor for double the damages
resulting from such failure. Or the mortgagor may
bring an action against the mortgagee to compel the
discharge or release of the mortgage after the same
has been satisfied; and the judgment of the court must
be that the mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all
damages resulting from such failure."
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From the foregoing statutory provisions, it is clear that
a demand must be made for release of a chattel mortgage but
that no demand is necessary for release of the real estate
mortgage.
,
In spite of the fact that statute pertaining to real estate
mortgages does not require a demand, the Defendant in its
Point II claims the court committed error in permitting tht
jury to award damages for failure to release real estate mort·
gages because no demand was made. To support such a conten~
tion, the Defendant cites 56 ALR 337. The authorities relied
upon for the statement in the annotati<?n are cases from only
three jurisdictions, 11issouri, North Dakota and ~~ebraska.
The laws of all three of those states specifically require a demand or request and further provide for a time in which the
demand or request must be satisfied. Clearly such statutes are
distinguishable from the statute here in Utah. Two other states,
New Mexico and New Hampshire, have statutes similar to the
one in Utah. Neither of those two jurisdictions have held that
a demand or request for release is a condition precedent to the
bringing of an action under the statutes.
Defendant cites the case of Shibata v. Bear River State
Bank, 205 P. 2d 251, a Utah case~ inferring that a request or
demand is necessary by the mortgagor before a penalty can be
assessed under Section 57-3-8 UCA, 1953. In no place in the
Shibata case does the court state or even imply anything about
a demand or request for release. The facts of the case did not
in any way give rise to the issue of a demand.
The statute does not provide for a demand. That the
legislature could have so provided is clear since such a provision
is contained in the section dealing with chattel mortgages.
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There are no Utah cases nor cases from other jurisdictions
having a similar statute which in any way infer or state that
a request or demand must first be made before the penalty
of the statute may be imposed.
The Defendant in its brief states as follows:
''The record in this connection shows that no demand
was ever made for the release of chattel mortgage until
1954."
Not only is this in dispute, but the record shows sufficient
demands commencing in August of 1950.
Previous reference has been made to the discussion in
August, 1950, at the time of the execution of the last real
estate mortgage. The Defendant secured the execution of that
real estate mortgage upon the representation that the mortgages
would be released.
In 1950, Mr. Nalder, Jr. went to Omaha and paid the 1950
account in full. At the time of that payment, he testified the
following conversation was had with Mrs. Schinker, an agent
of the Defendant:
A. The check that I had taken back was for about
$14,000.00, and she got out our account and went
over it with me and said: ··This here pays your
1950 account in full, and we'll apply $900.00 on
your '49 account, which will take care of the interest and leave a balance of some $300.00." Then
she made a check out to me, and she says: .. I'm
sorry that this isn't more" and I don't know just
how I stated it, but the question of the mortgages
being released was brought up, and she said: .. Mr.
Williams is in Los Angeles, and we'll wait until
he gets back before we release the mortgages."
Q. Did you discuss with them the release of the mortgages?
A. Yes." (Tr. 318).
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Corroboration of Mr. Nalder's testimony that the mortgages were discussed is contained in a letter from Mrs. Schinker
to Mr. Nalder, Jr., dated December 8, 1950, which refers to
their meeting and further states:
((Undoubtedly some satisfactory arrangements can
be made for settling the balance due on your 1949
account, but we will withhold releasing mortgages until
we hear further from Mr. Williams." (Ex. C 10, App.

8).

.

From the foregoing, it is clear that releasing of the mortgages was discussed and considered by the defendant on December 8, 1950, when the 1950 contract was paid in full, and
that the Plaintiff was led to believe the release of the mortgage
v1as imminent.
On the same date that the letter was dictated to Mr. Nalder,
Jr., fron1 Mrs. Schinker, Mrs. Schinker wrote a letter to Mr.
Williams at Salt Lake City as follows:
nThe attached copy of a letter to Mr. William Nalder
will be self-explanatory. His 1950 account is all clear
and he has paid the interest charges up to December 15
on his 1949 account.
((The principal on the 1949 account amounts to
$6,627.39. He '\vas wondering what the interest rate
would be. Since I was not sure \vhether it would be
four, five or eight, I did not commit myself.

rrwe ·will !lOt

have any of the 11ZOFtgages released,
either the cbattels or real eJtate. until we have advice
franz you." (Ex. C 9, App. 7).
The Plaintiffs n1ade application to Pillsbury, Ralston Purina, General Mills, and Farmer's Grain Coop. for financing
(Tr. 48, 15 5). The details of this matter will be discussed under
Proximate Cause. As a result of a request from GeneralMills,
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Mr. Nalder, Jr. called and wrote to Mr. Aust requesting cooperation from Kellogg (Tr. 141, Ex. D-14, App. 14).
In the letter it was stated as follows:
nl understand from Dad that you will not be feeding
us this year but that you would be willing to let another
feed company do so, letting them have first lien to the
extent of their services. I have arranged for some poults
and a company to feed them providing they get confirmation from you that they will be assured of their
money first. I would like to remain in turkeys if possible and try to clear off our outstanding obligations.
((If such a satisfactory arrangement can be worked
out with you people, I wish you would send me confirmation so I can turn it over to the feed company
as that is the only thing holding it up and my turkeys
are scheduled to arrive the first week in March."
Although the letter does not, in the strict technical terms,
make a formal demand for a release of prior mortgages, it is
clear that the Defendant's attention was called to the problem
of prior unreleased mortgages.
Concerning these letters, Mr. Williams testified as follows:
Q. All right. He was calling attention then to his prior
accounts, was he not?
A. Oh, surely.
Q. And to go ahead and finance with other companies,
he could be permitted to do so by one or two ways,
either a release of the mortgage or a subordination
agreement, is that true?
A. That is true.
Q. And your attention then was directed to the proposition of the unreleased mortgages, was it not, by
that type of letter?
Mr. Bowen to witness: You may answer, if you know.
A. Yes." (Tr. 346, 347).
Mr. Aust, the credit manager, testified as follows:
Q. (Reading) C(As mentioned in our conference, upon
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receipt ?f these remittances we will be in a position
to f~rntsh you with a subordination agreement al~owtng you to secure turkey financing elsewhere
Inasmuch as our mortgage is still of record."
Now the question again was do you recall discussing the subordination agreement or mortgages in
that conference?
A. Subordination agreement, yes.
Q. This would recall to your mind the fact the mortgages were still of record, would it not?
A. Yes.

*

*

*

*

Q. Would that have called your attention to unreleased
mortgages?
A. I believe it \vould, yes." (Tr. 401, 402).
Under statutes requiring demand, the courts have consistently held that the request need not be L.1 any particular form
and that no formalities are required. It need only call the
mortgagee's attention to the fact that the indebtedness has
been paid and the request for satisfaction has been made. In
56 ALR 33 7 it is stated:
ttA demand to satisfy is sufficient which calls to the
attention of the mortgagee the fact that the indebtedness secured by the mortgage has been paid and requests, in consideration of that payment, that satisfaction of the mortgage be made, under a statute which
requires the discharge tat the request of the person
making satisfaction,' without otherwise prescribing the
form or substance of the request. Barnett v. Bank of
Malvern {1928)-Ark. 4 S.W. 2d 17.
ttThe request under such statute may be either oral
or written. Ibid.
nAnd, although the request need not be presented
in any particular form, yet the language in its fair and
reasonable meaning must inform the mortgagee as to
what is desired. Jordan v. Mann ( 1877) 57 Ala. 595.
ttThe fact that the mortgagee did not understand
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the notice as a request to enter satisfaction will not
excuse his delinquency, if the reasonable intendment
of the request conveyed a desire for satisfaction. Ibid.''
In 59 C.J.S. 746, it is stated:
((No particular form of words is necessary for this
demand; it is sufficient if it informs the mortgagee with
reasonable certainty that an entry of satisfaction of
the particular mortgage is requested. * * * *
The unreleased chattel mortgages purported to mortgage
after acquired property, and therefore there was a question,
recognized by Kellogg, of whether the company currently
financing would have a first lien on the turkeys. Under such
circumstances it was necessary that either the mortgages be
released or a subordination agreement would have to be given
by the Defendant. It is clear that the Defendant was aware of
the prior unreleased mortgages and their effect upon the Plaintiffs' ability to secure additional financing. On January 30,
1952, Mr. Ault, the credit manager, wrote to H. W. Nalder,
Sr. and Jr., acknowledging payment in full on the 1951 account,
but nevertheless stated as follows:
((We are awaiting the remaining balance for the 1951
turkeys which were sold locally. We understand that
Bill traded $352 worth of turkeys to take care of a
gasoline bill, and of course, inasmuch as we had a mortgage on these turkeys, that amount must be remitted
to us together with the remaining balance as discussed
with Mr. Williams recently. We would appreciate
having these funds forwarded to us so that we would
be able to release the mortgage and return the notes
to you. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated."
(Emphasis added.) (Ex. D 13, App. 13).
On February 18, 1952, the Defendant wrote to Mr. Nalder,
Jr. in replying to his letter of February 2, advising him that
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until the $352 was paid a subordination agreement could not
be given. (Ex. D-16, App. 16).
Again on December 22, 1952, the Defendant wrote to
Mr. N alder stating as follows:
((As me.ntioned in our conference, upon receipt of
these ~emtttances we will be in a position to furnish
you wtth a subordination agreement allowing you to
secure turkey financing elsewhere inasmuch as our
mortgage is of record.n (Ex. D 21-5, App. 23).
There is no question but what the credit manager of
Kellogg knev1 that the mortgages were still of record and t.~at
those mortgages \vere preventing and prohibiting the Plaintiffs
from securing financing. Requests by the Plaintiffs to the
Defendant that others be permitted to finance the Plaintiffs
certain! y amounted to a demand for release of the mortgages
since they had been paid or had been merged into the last real
estate mortgage.
In August, 1950, a conversation \Vas had with reference
to merging the 1949 obligations into the last real estate mortgage. In Decen1ber of 1950, Bill Nalder paid off the 1950
account and had a discussion with an agent of the Defendant
pertaining to the release of mortgages. At the end of the year
19 51 a conversation was had at the Hotel Utah wherein subordination of the Kellogg· s claims to that of other companies
was discussed. Letters, telegrams and telephone calls were
made during the first t\\'O n1onths of 1952 requesting permission for other con1panies to finance the Plaintiffs; yet in spite
of all this evidence, the Defendant contends the record is without dispute uthat no demand was ever made for the release
of the chattel mortgages until the end of 1953 or early 1954."
It is submitted that repeated demands were n1ade calling to
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the attention of the Kellogg Company the fact that the mortgages were not released and should have been released.
Demands made during January, February and March,
1954, for release of the 1951 chattel mortgage are contained in correspondence between Ralston-Purina Company
2nd the Defendant. On January 28, 1954, Ralston-Purina Company wrote to the Kellogg Sales Company inquiring if Kellogg
was willing to release the 1951 chattel mortgage (Ex. G-6,
App. 27). Mr. Aust of Kellogg Company advised them that
the mortgages had been released. Ralston on February 5, 1954,
wrote the County Recorder for confirmation. The County Recorder replied that the mortgage had not been released as of
February 7, 1954 (Ex. G-7, App. 28). Again on March 4th
Ralston wrote to Mr. Aust stating that, although they had been
informed that the mortgages had been released, the public
record did not so indicate (Ex. G-8, App. 29). Mr. Aust replied
on March 8th that releases had been prepared on January 21,
but since the account was involved in litigation, the releases
had been forward to counsel rather than to the recorder (Ex.
G-9, App. 30).
The three chattel mortgages were finally released on
March 11, 1954, after this law suit became imminent (Ex.
A 4, 5 and 6).
It is a well recognized rule of law that the law does not
require useless and needless acts. It is obvious from the position
of the Defendant that demands would be just such an occurrence. It was clear after February 18, 1952, a request for release
of the mortgages or subordination would be futile unless the
$352.00 payment was made (Ex. D-16, App. 16). In view of
the company's policy, it is likewise clear that the demand for
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release of the mortgages would be a futile gesture. Mr. Williams, the plant manager at Omaha, testified that it was a policy
of the company to never release a mortgage as long as there
was any outstanding indebtedness. He testified as follows:

Q. Mrs. Schinker would discuss with you the problem
of releasing this mortgage, would she not?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she ask you?
A. I received a copy of the letter which she sent out
and subsequent!y I told her we would not release
the mortgage.
Q. You told her you would not release the mortgage?
A. Yes.
Q. What mortgage were you talking about?
A. All existing mortgages at that time." (Tr. 342, 343).
Under such circumstances the Plaintiffs \Vere clearly not
required to make any further demands for release of mortgages
after February, 1952. By statute, no demand is required for a
release of real estate mortgages. Numerous demands were made
to facilitate the financing of turkeys wit.~ other companies.
Refusal to release the mortgages was consistently made by conditionally offering to subordinate provided an additional payment of $352 for 1951 was made. Since the 1951 contract
had been paid in full, the mortgages should have been released.

(D) THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ACT IN GOOD
FAITH IN FAILING TO RELEASE THE MORTGAGES.
(DEFENDANT'S POINT VII).
It is stated by Defendant that since Mr. Williams was
acting upon advice of counsel the company was therefore acting
ing good faith. It is also stated that there is no other evidence
on this matter except the testimony of Defendant's witnesses.
The record will disclose nine instances where the Defendant
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company was not acting in good faith but rather went out of
its way to the detriment of the Plaintiffs.
1. At the conversation of Hotel Utah previously referred
to, Mrs. N alder testified the following was stated:
A. He said: CtDo you folks know you could have went
to the penitentiary for taking those $352.00 worth
of turkeys?", and he said: CCI will not feed you or
let anybody else feed you,'' and I said, c (Then how
can we pay Kellogg?", and he said: CtThat' s up
to you. That's your hard luck." (Tr. 222).
She further testified that the discussion became very heated
and they became a little angry. Testimony to the same effect
was given at Pages 151 and 73 of the transcript.
That threat was carried out as will be shown by the other
matters discussed under this sub-paragraph.
2. After Bill Nalder had written his letter of February 2,
1952, requesting authorization for another feed company to
finance them, the following inter-office communication was
sent by the credit mangaer to the plant manager:
(]would like to tell him that we will have to have the
$352.00 for 1951 turkeys which he traded for the gas
bill before we could agree to write such a letter. What
do you think? I doubt if he can pay this but it might
work." (Ex. D 15, App. 15). (Emphasis added.)
3. Thereafter, the Defendant continually insisted upon
the $352.00 payment even though their own letters and ledger
sheet acknowledged that they had been paid in full for 1951.
(Ex. D-16, D-20, D-21, D-21.5, D-22, D-23, App. 16, 18,
21, 22, 23, 24 and 25).
4. When the Defendant was not advised by the Plaintiffs
as to what companies were considering financing them, they
wrote the following officious letters to Farmers Grain Com-
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pany and apparently sent a copy to General Mills (Tr. 129).
The letter is dated February 26, 1952:
((Ge~t~emen: We recently had a request from Mr.
H. Wllham Nalder, Jr., to subordinate a lien which
we have on his 1951 flock of turkeys.
((We have written to Mr. Nalder and notified him
that upon receipt of his remittance of $352.00 we
would agree to furnish the subordination agreement
to cover the remaining balance for prior years, but we
must have the 1951 account cleaned up first. We also
asked Mr. Nalder the name of the feed company that
intended to finance him for this season but as yet we
have not received a reply to our letter. (Emphasis
added.)
'''}le t~nderstand that you folks are contemplating
financing his 1952 turkey program and ;'/e wish to
cotify you at this tune that v;,Te still have a lien on his
turkeys. If there should be any further questions on
this we would appreciate having you contact us." (Ex.
F 10, App. 17).
From the foregoing letter, it is obvious that they did not

know the nan1e of the feed company intending to finance the
Plaintiffs. Also, it is obvious that the statement to the effect that
Defendant still had a lien on the 1951 flock of turkeys for
failure to make payment of $352.00 on the 1951 account,
would be in direct conflict with the application of the Plaintiffs,
since they represented that the 1951 season had been successful
and the amount paid in full. The effect of such a letter sent
to a business contemplating granting credit would only result
in the disapproval of the application. Certainly the Defendant
went out of its \Yay in writing the letter knowing that the
result would be to prevent financing by other companies.
5. The Defendant openly admitted that they insisted upon
double liability when additional financing was granted. The
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first real estate mortgage was for $4,000.00 even though only
$2,000.00 was advanced. In addition to testifying as to such
a policy, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. Quinney, August 2, 1950,
and stated as follows:
ttlt has been our custon1 where additional finance
vv-as required to require security at the rate of two for
one. In other words, $2.00 worth of security for each
$1.00 furnished on additional finance. * * *
rrwe may be entirely off the beam in drawing a mortgage for an amount larger than we expect the account
to become, but we feel that it is some protection to have
a recorded amount in that figure, and if by some extreme
it was necessary to advance more than was originally
requested, there would not have been an opportunity
for the grower to have placed another mortgage, which
would come in between the mortgage we might file now
and another one some 60 to 90 days later. You might
advise us as to this procedure. We understand that
in most states the mortgage has to be backed up by
notes but of course we would never attempt to collect
any more than the account actually amounted to regardless of the size of the mortgage." (Ex. C-7.5,
App. 5). (Emphasis added.)
6. Bill Nalder testified that at the time the 1950 payment
was made he was advised the mortgages would be released
after the return of Mr. Williams (Tr. 318). Mrs. Schinker
of Kellogg Company wrote to Mr. Nalder confirming that the
mortgages would probably be released after consultation with
Mr. Williams (Ex. C-10, App. 8). However, in an interoffice
letter it was clearly stated that the mortgages would not be
released until ordered by Mr. Williams (Ex. C-9, App. 7).
Mr. Williams ordered that the mortgages not be released since
it was the policy of the Company never to release a mortgage
as long as there was an unpaid balance. This policy was never
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communicated to the Plaintiffs; rather, they were lead to believe
that release of the mortgages would be taken care of in due
course.
7. There is no question but that the Defendant knew that
as long as the mortgages were unreleased the Plaintiff would
not be able to secure financing. Mention of this fact was made

in their letter of December 22, 1952 (Ex. D-21.5, App. 23).
Mr. Aust, the credit manager, testified that he knew it was a
policy of the large feed companies not to finance a grower as
long as there was a prior unreleased mortgage of another feed
company (Tr. 382-4). Mr. Williams testified that his company, as well as other companies, would not grant financing
without securing releases of prior turkey mortgages because
they purported to give a lien on future acquired turkeys (Tr.
358, 465).
8. The correspondence between Ralston-Purina Company
and the Defendant during the first months of 1954 pertaining
to a request that the 1951 mortgage be released has been
referred herein. The dilatory and irresponsive lack of concern
on the part of the Defendant certainly did not show good faith.
(See Ex. G-6, 7, 8 & 9, App. 27 to 30).
9. Upon receiving a letter from Ralston Purina Company,
Exhibit G-6, App. 27, the credit manager for the Defendant
called a representative of Ralston Purina at St. Louis. The
letter merely asked if the Defendant was willing to release
the mortgage. Nevertheless the agent of the Defendant proceded to tell the credit manager for Ralston Purina his personal
opinion of the Plaintiffs. A report of the call ":-as as follows:
''The credit n1an who called us (whose name I didn,t
catch) was personally acquainted \Yith the Nalders. He
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certainly did not have a very high opinion of the Nalders
and referred to Mrs. Nalder as the (troublemaker.' ,.

(Ex. G-10, App. 31).
Not only did the Defendant refuse to release the mortgages, they threatened to prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining
financing elsewhere, flippantly insisted that $352.00 be paid
before a subordination agreement would be granted since
((it might work," wrote officious letters misrepresenting the
facts to other feed companies, lightly den1anded double security
for additional financing, lead the Plaintiffs to believe the mortgages would be released while the company policy was completely opposite; exercised dilatory practices in releasing the
n1ortgages even . after suit was threatened and, finally, went
out of their way to advise the credit man of another company
that the Plaintiffs could not keep their promises; had failed
to account for turkeys; that they were troublemakers; and that
Defendant would not finance them. Rather than showing good
faith, the conduct of the Defendant was willful, wrongful,
and even malicious to an extent sufficient to sustain punitive
damages regardless of the statute specifying double damages
for failure to release the mortgages.
The issue of whether the defendant acted in good faith
is a question of fact for jury determination. The Court, by Instruction No. 17, instructed the jury ((that there can be no
recovery of damages * * * * if the mortgagee mistakenly,
but honestly, and in good faith" failed to release said mortgages." The jury found this factual issue against the defendant.
The foregoing evidence is more than adequate to justify the
submission of that issue to the jury and to sustain the verdict
on that issue.
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In Malarkey vs. O'Leary, 256 Pac. 521 (Oregon), the
court said that where the mortgagee refused to release the
mortgage after it had been paid because the mortgagor owed
another debt to him, that this was no defense to the action even
though the mortgagee acted in good faith. The court stated:
((He {the defendant) also claims that the answer
is sufficient, because it shows that the defendant was
acting in good faith, and under honest belief that he
was not required to satisfy the mortgage until payment
of the sum mentioned in the answer. But his good faith
is no defense. Although the statute is penal in its
character, the good faith of the mortgagee in refusing
to cancel a mortgage of record will constitute no defense to an action brought to recover the penalty provided for in the statute, after the terms and conditions
of the mortgage have been admittedly complied with."
(Emphasis added.)
The Defendant in this case refused to release the mortgages
in an attempt to coerce the Plaintiff into paying an additional
payment. According to the Oregon case such conduct cannot
constitute a good faith defense.
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Company, supra, the court
discussed the question of good faith when the refusal to release
the mortgage is made to coerce an additional payment. The
court states as follo"~s:
((The evidence in the record indicates that appellant
refused to advance money under the contract in an attempt to force payment on another contract. And appellant offered to release the mortgage only if re~
bursed for its expenditures, although by its own act tt
had breached the contract and made it impossible for
respondent to proceed. Appellant failed to establish
that it acted in (good faith' in refusing to release the
mortgage.
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nA party who contracts to lend money to another
to build a house, taking a mortgage thereon as security,
observes the other party spend money and time and
perform as agreed, it refuses for reasons of coercion
connected with another matter to advance money as
agreed, can hardly insist that he acted in entire good
faith and should therefore be protected from payment
of certain damages.''
The Defendant asserts that the penal provisions of the
statute should not be applied because the Defendant was acting
in good faith. To support this contention, the Defendant cites
the case of Shibata v. Bear River Bank, supra. It is true the
Utah court adopted the good faith rule in th~t case, but it was
based upon the fact that the mortgagee was acting in good
faith ''because he believes there has been no full satisfaction,''
or because he ''honestly thinks that it had a valid and subsisting
mortgage against appellant which had not been satisfied." In
this case the Defendant cannot claim that it thought it had
valid and subsisting mortgages, since its own documents showed
payment in full and since the Defendant refused to release
the mortgages because it was the policy of the company to
never release any mortgages so long as there was an unpaid
balance. There could be no good faith assertion that the Defendant thought the 1950 and 1951 chattel mortgages were
valid and subsisting. Kellogg's own ledger sheets and correspondence show that those obligations had been paid in full.
The distinction that the good faith must be a belief that there
had been no full satisfaction is supported by the numerous
cases cited in the annotation in 56 ALR 345. The good faith
necessary is a good faith belief in the proposition that the debt
secured by the mortgage has not been paid. It would be easy
to circumvent legislative intent by merely claiming good faith
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because counsel advised Defendants to follow a given course of
conduct. The statute clearly specified what should be done
when a mortgage is satisfied. Defendant cannot escape liability
by claiming that they were advised to ignore the provisions
of the statute. Such: is not the good faith intent necessary to
escape the provisions of the statute.
(E) AGENTS OF THE DEFENDANT HAD EITHER
ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT
THE DEFENDANTS. (DEFENDANT'S POINT VIII).
Previous reference has been made to the conversations had
with Mr. Scoville, Mrs. Schinker and the credit manager, Mr.
Aust. Mr. Scoville was directed to take the notes and mortgages
and have them executed by the Nalders after the deficit in
1949 was established. Letters Exhibits C-4, C-5, C-8, Appendix
3, 4 & 6 are directives from the Defendant to Mr. Scoville
concerning this matter. In a letter of August 2, 1950, Mr. Williams, the plant manager, advised Mr. Quinney to contact Mr.
Scoville for the purpose of having the mortgage signed (Ex.
C-7.5, App. 5).
Mrs. Schinker had authority to receive the money, so it
would appear that she had some authority to discuss the releasing of the mortgages upon payment in full. Mr. Williams
admitted that she was familiar with the policy of the company
regarding releasing mortgages and had authority to discuss
such policy (Tr. 340-3). Mr. Aust in his letters stated that
upon payn1ent of $352.00 the mortgages would be released
(Ex. D-13, App. 13 and Ex. D-21.5, App. 23). Again Mr.
Williams admitted Mr. Aust as credit manager had a responsible position with the company, and was familiar with the
policy of the company (Tr. 336-7). Although the employees
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freely discussed the matter of releasing the mortgages, it now
appears from the testimony of Mr. Williams that he was the
only one with authority to release mortgages. If the agents did
not have actual authority, certainly they had apparent authority
so far as the plaintiffs were concerned. Representatives of the
Defendant who requested execution of the mortgagees received the money paying the contract in full; discussed and
insisted upon payment of additional amounts before mortgages
would be released, must have had some authority.
According to 59 C.J.S. 756, a demand may be served on
an agent or clerk of the mortgagee, in which case it will be
sufficient if such person had authority to receive it, or if knowledge of it is brought home to the mortgagee. (Emphasis
added.)
In Scoville v. Kellogg, 1 Utah 2d 19, 261 P. 2d 933, the
Defendant attempted to disclaim liability on a bonus arrangement with its salesmen on the ground that its representative
did not have authority to bind the Defendant. The court held
it was error to strike the representative's testimony since he had
executed a written bonus plan and had sent correspondence
concerning bonus payments.
In the present case the Plaintiffs were dealing with representatives who were signing application, receipts for payment,
and making written demand for payments in which they stated
that, upon receiving said payments, mortgages would be released.
In each case, before any conversation involving Scoville
or Mrs. Schinker was permitted, Mr. Williams was called out
of order and testified concerning their positions with the Defendant company. (Scoville, Tr. 44-54; Schinker, Tr. 31345
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317) . The court gave careful consideration to Defendant's
claim of lack of authority before such evidence was admitted.
These representatives had sufficient authority to receive
and transmit a demand for the release of the mortgages to an
agent of the Defendant who did have authority. Mr. Williams
was advised of Mr. Nalder, Jr.'s letter requesting authority
for financing by another company. Mr. Williams was advised
by Mrs. Schinker that the 1950 account had been paid in full
and that mortgages would not be released until so advised
by him. When asked what advice was given to Mrs. Schinker,
Mr. Williams said, CCYes, I told her we will not release the
mortgage" (Tr. 342). It was admitted that Mr. Williams
had authority to release the mortgages. Even after an agent of
the Defendant with authority received the information, it
appears that there was no intention of releasing the mortgages
since it was stated emphatically that it was the policy of the
company not to release any mortgages so long as there was an
unpaid balance. Even if the agents did not have authority
to actually release the mortgages, they had authority to discuss
the matter with the plaintiffs and to communicate those matters
to persons with authority. As far as the plaintiffs were concerned, they were dealing with people acting 'vithin the scope
of their employment concerning n1atters \vhich the agents were
directed to discuss \vith the plaintiffs and, therefore, they were
justified in assuming that the agents had actual authority even
though it an1ounted to only apparent authority which is equally
binding upon the principal.

CONCLUSION, POINT ONE
All of the matters argued under this point were presented
to the Supreme Court by the Defendant upon the prior appeal.
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The Defendant strenuous! y argued that there was no duty to
release any of the mortgages until the 1949 account was paid
in full. The Court's holding has previous!y been quoted ruling
against the Defendant. The Defendant also argued that no
demand had been made, that the Defendants had acted in good
faith, and that the agents of the Defendant did not have
authority. The Plaintiffs felt that the Court was searching for
grounds for reversal because of the amount of the judgment,
but found no substance in such arguments. Rather, a reversal
was granted because the trial court had not distinguished
between the parties, an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
The Supreme Court, by its decision, knew that the case would
be retired but did not feel constrained to pass upon those issues
as raised by the Defendants. In fact, the Court felt compelled to
emphasize the fact that none of the mortgages had been re-.
leased, even though there was only approximately $6,000.00
owing. The court stated as follows:
((The Kellogg Company refused to finance the
Nalders in 1952. At this time there were on record in
favor of the Kellogg Company chattel mortgages executed by Nalder, Sr. and Jr. in 1949, 1950 and 1951,
and real estate mortgages executed by Mr. and Mrs.
Nalder in 1949 and 1950 totalling $107,401.92. Not
one of the mortgages was ever released by the company
until shortly before the instant case was filed in 1954,
notwithstanding the fact that the 1949 deficit of some
$6,000.00 was the only debt owing the company franz
the Nalders/'
Whether the mortgages had been paid, or satisfied by
merger, whether there had been a demand, and whether the
defendant had acted in good faith, are all factual issues. They
were all properly submitted to the jury with adequate instruc-

·
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tions. The jury's verdict on these issues is more than adequately
sustained by substantial competent evidence.
POINT TWO. PROXIMATE CAUSE
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE THE MORTGAGES
WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE. (DEFENDANT'S POINT VI).
The question of proximate cause is an issue for jury determination. The Court properly submitted this issue to the
jury with adequate instructions. The evidence justifying such
submission and the determination thereon is as follows:
1. At the end of 1951 the defendant had on record the
following mortgages:
Chattel Mortgages
May 16, 1959 ______________________________ $24,000.00
March 13, 1950 -------------------------- 23,300.00
April 4, 1951 -------------------------------- 42,825.00
Real Estate Mortgages
February 14, 1949 ---------------------- 4,000.00
April 1, 1950 --------------------.------------ 6, 721.80
August 15, 1950 -------------------------- 6,555.12
TotaL ___________________________ $1 07,401.92
The effect upon a person's credit rating in having a mortgage of $6,5 55.12 of record as contrasted with mortgages of
$107,401.92 is obvious. Recognizing the cautiousness of lending
institutions, it would appear that the Court could take judicial
notice that unreleased mortgages of $107,401.92 would be
sufficient to so impair one's credit rating so as to prevent the
securing of credit for future financing.
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2. The Plaintiffs made application

to Ralston Purina,
General Mills, Sperry-Globe Mills, and to Farmers Grain
Co-op., being most, if not all, of the feed companies operating
in the Ogden area. Even though the salesman and field representatives in each case recommended the approval of the application, in all cases the applications were refused when sent
in to the credit department (Tr. 96, 108, 505).
3. On Dece~ber 7, 1951, an application was made to
General Mills for turkey financing. The salesman, in writing
up his report to the company, recommended that the application be granted. On December 17, 1951, the credit manager
dictated a memorandum to the salesman stating the Nalders
V/Ould have to have Kellogg release the mortgages or secure
a subordination agreement (Ex. F-4).
Exhibit F-5 shows that General Mills wrote to the County
Recorder of Davis County and in reply was advised of the
three unreleased chattel mortgages as specified above. In Exhibit F-6 an interoffice correspondence between the supervising
credit manager at San Francisco to the credit manager at Ogden,
it is stated as follows:
((We certainly have mingled feelings about this one
and while we have finally concluded to approve itJ we
ask that you be satisfied on one or two points before
actually proceeding to notify the grower. * * * *
((It would be necessary that Kellogg Sales Company
release the mortgage on the turkeys which are of record-or they must be clearly subordinated in form of
subordination acceptable to us, proper! y executed by
Kellogg, and that subordination must be filed or recorded before we could proceed." (Emphasis added.)
Other matters were mentioned in the letter which would
have to be discussed and cleared up with the applicant.
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Exhibit F-8 is a memorandum concerning a telephone conversation between the credit manager at Ogden and the applicant. In part, it stated as follows:
((By telephone today, Mr. Nalder gave us the answer
to the points brought out in Mr. J. S. Hall's letter of
2-6-2 on the subject * * * Nalder still trying to get
subordination from Kellogg and understands we would
not finance without it." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the foregoing that General Mills was
willing to finance Plaintiffs provided the chattel mortgages
were released or if it would subordinate its position to that of
General Mills.
4. Mr. Clair Rasmussen, a feed dealer at 0 gden representing Ralston-Purina Company, further testified that, after
consultation with the credit department of his company, he
advised the N alders that they had unreleased mortgages which
would have to be cleared from the records of the County Recorder's office (Tr. 268-9).
5. Robert Brown, credit manager for Ralston-Purina, testified that the Kellogg unreleased mortgages were a contributing cause for the refusal of the Plaintiffs' application (Tr. 483,
492, 500). He further testified:
uA. We \\ 0uld definitely '\Yant a chattel mortgage that
anyone had covering turkeys. explicitly turkeys,
we would "rant that mortgage released before we
would enter into a contract with a grower as a
turkey operation." (Tr. 499).
6. It is clear that the representative of the defendants
knew that the unreleased mortgages would prevent the securing
of additional financing. Mr. Williams, the plant manager, after
having his attention called to the fact that he had stated they
were only relying on the real estate mortgage, and after being
7
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asked if any attempt had been made to claim a lien on the
turkeys raised during 1952, 195 3 and 1954, stated as follows:

Q. Would your company loan money to a grower,
where there is an outstanding chattel mortgage in
favor of another company, which has a provision
purporting to give a lien on turkeys which might
be acquired in the future?
(Discussion by counsel and court.)
A. We would under certain circumstances.
Q. Under what circumstances?
A. If we had a subordination agreement with the other
company, and the credit reputation and all other
matters being satisfactory.
Q. But you would insist upon either that they be released or a subordination agreement, would you not?
A. Yes, we would." (Tr. 358 (a)
7. Mr. Aust, the credit manager for Kellogg, knew that
financing could not be secured as long as the mortgages were
of record. In a letter dated December 22, 1952, to Mr. Nalder,
he stated in part as follows:
((As mentioned in our conference, upon receipt of
these remittances we will be in a position to furnish
you with a subordination agreement allowing you to
secure turkey financing elsewhere inasmuch as our
mortgage is still of record." (Emphasis added.) (Ex.
D 21-5, App. 23).
Mr. Aust testified that he knew that neither Kellogg nor
any other large feed company would finance the Plaintiffs as
long as the mortgages were of record. After reluctantly admitting that Kellogg would not have financed the N alders
if some other company had unreleased mortgages of record,
he testified as follows:

Q. All right. You would insist then, as these other
companies-like General Mills and Ralston-Purina
-that they either be released as subordinated ?
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A. If we were going to finance them, yes.
Q. Have you had experience with any other large feed
company?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Name the company, please.
A. Orchard, Daniel, Midland Company.
Q. Any others?
A. No. That's the only one I have worked directly with.
Q. Are you familiar with the policy of that company
in making feed financing?
A. They're pretty much the same as Kellogg.
Q. Could we say then that they too would have insisted
upon a release or discharge of these turkey chattel
mortgages, before they would have financed?
A. I would say yes." (Tr. 383).

*

*

*

*

Q. Well, do these provisions in these turkey chattel
mortgages, purport to give a lien on turkeys acquired in the future, play any part in this requirement?
A. I would say yes.
Q. Isn't that an important factor?
A. I believe it is, yes.'' (Tr. 384).
It was conceded in the brief of the defendants that both
General Mills and Ralston-Purina were insisting that Kellogg's
chattel mortgages be released or a subordination agreement be
secured before any financing could be granted to the Plaintiffs.
On Page 10 it is stated: ttlt is conceded that one of the conditions for approval was a release or subordination of Defendant's
mortgages.'· On Page 12 it is stated: ttthat a release or subordination of Defendant's mortgages would have been necessary
in the event the application was accepted is not disputed." On
Page 41 it is stated: celt is not disputed that one of the requirements made by General Mills was for a release or subordination
of the debt owed to defendant., On Page 44 it is stated: uo£
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course, it was conceded that a release or subordination of
defendant's mortgages would have been necessary to the approval of an application."
8. Defendant repeatedly states that Plaintiffs had a poor

reputation and credit rating. Support for this contention is
claimed in connection with documents discussing the application filed with General Mills. The fact is simply that the application to General Mills would have been approved if a subordination agreement had been secured from Kellogg (Ex. F-6).
Furthermore, the financial condition of the Plaintiffs was substantially the same as it had been during the three years that
the Kellogg Company had been willing to finance them. Also
direct letters from Plaintiffs' creditors gave them a high rating
(Tr. 505-7).
9. In addition to the Defendant failing to release the
mortgages as required by law as constituting a proximate cause
for the Plaintiffs' failure to secure financing, the Defendant
took affirmative steps to further prevent the Plaintiffs from
securing their necessary financing. They went out of their way
to write officious letters (Exhibit F-10, App. 17) to Farmers
Grain Cooperative, and apparently sent a copy of General Mills
(Tr. 129). Further, the defendant volunteered information of
a derogatory nature, more particularly, gave his personal
opinion of the Plaintiffs, and stated that one of them was a
troublemaker (Ex. G-10) (Tr. 417).
10. The Defendant at the time of trial placed great emphasis before the jury upon the fact that there were numerous
unreleased household and equipment chattel mortgages other
than the mortgages of the defendant. It is submitted that none
of these chattel mortgages purported to give a lien on after
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acquired turkeys such as the defendant's mortgages. It was
consistently stated by other credit men, in addition to the representatives of the defendant, that a failure to release such
other type chattel mortgages would not necessarily prohibit the
approval of an application. In fact, Kellogg during the three
years that it financed the Plaintiffs, did not insist upon any
releases of these chattel mortgages, most of which were of
record at that time. Mr. Williams testified that the Kellogg
Company v1ould go ahead without demanding a release of
chattel mortgages on furniture (Tr. 465). Both Mr. Aust,
credit manager for Kellogg, and Mr. Brown, credit manager
for Ralston-Purina, testified to the same effect (Tr. 385, 498).
11. Defendant in its brief states that the Plaintiff tried the

case on the theory that the Defendant's failure to release the
mortgages was the sole proximate cause. Such is not the case.
It has consistently been the position of the Plaintiffs that if the
Defendant's failure to release the mortgages was a proximate
cause under the usual definition or was a substantial factor in
prohibiting the Plaintiffs from securing their financing, the
burden of proof would have been sustained. The failure to
release household-type chattel mortgages might have been a
contributing cause also. However, the court properly instructed
the jury that the la\v does not seek and recognize only one
proximate cause of damage, and that the acts or omissions of
two or more persons may work concurrently as an efficient cause
of any injury, and each of the participating acts or omissions
may be regarded in law as a proximate cause.
12. On Page 42 of the defendant's brief it is stated that

the application to General Mills would not have been ap·
proved since a guarantee had not been obtained by a local feed
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dealer. Mr. Robert Konrath, salesman for General Mills, testified that the necessary arrangements had been made to secure
such guarantee.
Proximate cause is established from the foregoing facts
that all of the salesmen recommended approval; that all of the
applications were turned down when sent to the credit department; that tentative approval was given by General Mills, subject to release as subordination agreement; that the feed dealer
for Ralston-Purina told the Plaintiffs the reason for the disapproval of their application was the unreleased mortgages;
and the recognition on the part of both Willian1s and Aust
and counsel for the Defendants that as long as the mortgages
were unreleased additional financing would not be secured.
As was stated in Malarkey v. O'Leary, 256 Pac. 521, 34
Or. 493:
t(An unsatisfied mortgage of record is constructive
notice of the existence of a debt, and necessarily tends
to injuriously affect the pecuniary standing and credit
of the mortgagor. When it is paid, the statute has
provided for its satisfaction on the record, so that the
fact of payment may be known to the world. The
reasonableness of the requirement is apparent. To insure its observance, the mortgagee is required to acknowledge the satisfaction of a mortgage, when paid,
in as public a manner as the mortgagor had acknowledged its existence, or suffer the statutory penalty.
And it is no defense that the rnortgagor may be otherwise indebted to the mortgagee.''
Without relying on all of the other evidence, it would
appear to be sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of proximate cause that the two officers of the Defendant company
acknowledged that the unreleased mortgages would prevent
subsequent financing by other feed companies. These admissions
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in addition to all the other evidence compels an affirmance
of the jury's findings on this factual issue.
POINT III-DAMAGES
THE LAW AND EVIDENCE SUSTAIN THE JURY'S
DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES (Defendant's Point IV).
There is no serious dispute as to the rules of law cited
by the defendant in its brief, wherein it is stated that damages
for loss of profits must be proven with reasonable certainty,
or that the damages ~ust be based upon some reasonable
formula. The plaintiff does not agree that damages for loss
of profits must always be established by proof of past experience. Usually this is the type of proof resorted to because there
is nothing better. However, in this case, the plaintiff actually
raised turkeys during the three years for which damages are
claimed. These damages were based upon actual experience
rather than resorting to something less definite, such as experiences prior to the years for which loss of profits are claimed.
If the damage is the certain result of the wrong of the
defendants, and the damages can be shown with any reasonable
certainty, the wrongdoer will not be heard to complain. In the
leading case of Story Parchment Company vs. Patterson Parchment Paper Company, 282 U.S. 555, 51 Sup. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed.
544, it is stated:
"It is true that there 'vas uncertainty as to the extent
of the damage, but there was none as to the fact of
the damage; and there is a clear distinction between the
measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that
petitioner had sustained some damage and a measure
of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amo~t.
The Rule which precludes the recovery of uncertam
damages applies to such as are not the certain result of
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the wrong, not to those damages which are definite! y
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect
of their amount. * * *
c CWhere the tort itself is of such a nature, as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with
certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person,
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer frotn making any
amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages
may not be determined by mere speculation or guess,
it will be enough if the evidence sho-vvs the extent of
the damages, as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot
be measured with the exactness and precision that would
be possible if the case, in which he alone is responsible
for making, were otherwise. (Citation of authorities).
As the Supreme Court of Michigan has forcefully declared, the risk of the uncertainty should be thrown
upon the wrongdoers instead of upon the injured party."
The plaintiffs assert there is no need to rely upon the foregoing rule since the evidence of damage is shown with reasonable certainty and is not based upon speculation or conjecture.
The defendant, both in the Statement of Facts at Pages 7,
10, and 12, and under Point IV on Page 36, argues strenuously
that there is no evidence to support the contention that the
plaintiffs would have raised 14,000 turkeys in each of the three
years in question. Although there is substantial competent evidence to support even a verdict computed upon 14,000 turkeys,
it would seem to be a sufficient answer to point out that this
is a factual question, and the jury apparently only awarded
damages computed on 6,000 turkeys each year, which was the
number raised during the last two years that the plaintiffs were
financed by the defendant. Computations on 14,000 turkeys
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resulted in a prayer for damages in the sum of $56,268.82,
The jury only awarded a verdict of $22,030.61.
1. The evidence reasonably shows that the plaintiffs had the
facilities to raise in excess of 14,000 turkeys per year. Mr. Nalder, Sr. had facilities for raising 6,000 turkeys near his home. It
was clearly established that his brooder house had a capacity to
brood 6,000 poults. For the three years that the defendant
financed the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs raised 5,000 the first year
and 6,000 each of the last two years (Ex. A 1 & 2 and E 1.5).
In addition to the facilities of Mr. Nalder, Sr., Mr. Nalder,
Jr. had leased a 900-acre ranch east of Bountiful, Utah, from
Deon Toone and had made arrangements for the use of the
brooder house of Seth Oberg, which had a capacity to brood
11,000 poults (Tr. 295). There was no evidence submitted
by the defendant in any way refuting the foregoing evidence.
2. The evidence sho~red that the plaintiffs intended to and
would have raised 14,000 turkeys.
Mr. Nalder, Jr. testified that he intended to raise 9,000
turkeys (Tr. 305, 306). An application for financing 9,000
turkeys was made by him to Farmers' Grain Co-op (Ex. H-1).
In fact, 9,000 turkeys were ordered and delivery tendered
( T r. 30 3) . Since financing had not been approved at the
time of delivery, the turkeys \\~ere not placed in the rented
brooder house, but rather 6,000 were placed in the brooder
house of Mr. Nalder, Sr. and the additional 3,000 were turned
over to another grower (Tr. 82 and 83). Mr. Nalder, Sr.
\vas to receive his turkeys at a later date. When financing
could not be secured, the 6,000 turkeys actually brooded were
taken from him.
In addition to the 9,000 ordered by Mr. Nalder, Jr., Mr.
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Nalder, Sr. made application to ratse 5,000 turkeys on his
ranch where 6,000 turkeys had been raised for each of the
past two years.
Since an application, order, and delivery of 9,000 turkeys
had been made for the ranch east of Bountiful, and since an
application had been made for 5,000 turkeys to be raised on
the home ranch, the jury would have been justified in finding
the plaintiffs intended to and had the facilities to raise 14,000
turkeys. The defendant offered no testimony in any way refuting the foregoing evidence.
3. In a normal loss of profits case involving the raising
of turkeys, there would be considerable uncertainty as to the
price which would have been paid for the turkeys, the price
paid for feed, the number of turkeys which might have died,
and the price at which the turkeys would have been sold.
However, in this case such uncertainty was not present since
the plaintiffs actually raised some turkeys in each of the
years for which a loss is claimed. Thus, the purchase price, the
cost of the feed, the mortality loss, and sales price was established without any speculation as to whether the plaintiffs
would have bought or sold when the market prices were up or
down.
~

When the plaintiffs could not secure financing from the
feed companies, Mr. Rasmussen, a feed dealer in Ogden, cosigned with the plaintiff at the First Security Bank, enabling
him to raise a small herd of turkeys each year. The plaintiffs
raised 1,018 turkeys in 1952, 1,430 turkeys in 1953, and 2,200
turkeys in 1954. These amounts were taken into consideration
in computing damages.
Mr. N alder testified as to the amount paid for the turkeys,
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feed, electricity, and a watchman. The amount for processing
the turkeys at the end of the year is shown by the manifest
sheet of the processing plant (Ex. L) . These amounts were
summarized on Exhibit H-1, App. 33). The amounts actually
received for the turkeys is shown by Exhibit L. From these
facts the profit per bird was computed and the mortality rate
established.
In 1952 the plaintiffs sold 986 turkeys and would have
lost 414 turkeys out of 14,000 based upon the established
mortality rate of 3.1 per cent. These amounts were deducted
from 14,000 leaving 12,300 turkeys to which the average profit
of $1.86 per turkey was applied (Ex. N-1, App. 33).
Similar computations were made for 1953 and 1954,
based upon ledger sheets from the feed company and processing plant (Ex. R, Q and I) and upon personal testimony (Tr.
331) which even took into account taxes, insurance, and depreciation (Ex. N 1-4, App. 36).
The foregoing evidence clearly established initial cost,
maintenance and feeding expenses, sales price and expenses,
and mortality rate. These amounts were then extended to show
the actual loss of the plaintiffs by being denied the right to
raise the number of turkeys for which they had ample facilities.
Such evidence certainly presented to the jury a reasonable
basis for determining the loss of the plaintiffs. It presented
a much stronger case than one attempting to project loss of
profits based upon past experience. Rather, it gave an index
under actual conditions for each of the years and eliminated
any speculation as to whether the plaintiffs would have sold
their turkeys when the market price was higher and eliminated
any speculation as to how many turkeys the plaintiffs would
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have lost during the course of each year. The defendant introduced no evidence whatsoever refuting the foregoing matters
pertaining to damages.
4. The plaintiffs introduced and the jury deducted amounts
in mitigation of the damages. From the total amount of loss
sustained for the three years was deducted the rent on the
ranch, amounting to $3,600, which was not paid because the
lease was cancelled. In addition, the salary received by William
Nalder, Jr., for the period of time which he would have been
spending his full time raising the turkeys was deducted, amounting to $6,600 (Ex. N, App. 36).
The defendant maintains that the sole and exclusive
method of proving loss of profits is by projecting past performance. This is not the rule of law which is applicable. The rule
is that damages must be proved with reasonable certainty.
Past performance is the method normally used, but it is not
exclusive. Other methods may be used, provided they comply
with the requirement that damages are shown with some reasonable certainty.
In City of Corning vs. Iowa-Nebraska Light and Power
Company, 225 Iowa 1380, 282 N.W. 791, the court held that
the evidence of the first year's operations of a power plant
could be used to establish the profits which would have been
earned during the prior 11 months when the plant was not
in operation due to conduct of the defendant. In so doing the
court stated:
((Defendants urge that because the Corning municipal electric light, power and distributing system was
a new business and had not been in operation or existence, that the loss of profits or loss of use of a plant
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not in being yet is too speculative and uncertain to form
a basis for recovery.
We do not concur in this contention. * * * *
Defendants insist that, conceding the plant was, in
effect, an established business, the profits sought to
be recovered as damages are too speculative, remote
a.nd uncertain to permit recovery and are not susceptible to legal proof. The rule against certain damages
applies where there is uncertainty as to the cause of
the damages and as to the fact of legal damages. The
damages claimed must be the certain result of the
alleged breach on which the injured party relied. If
the damages are the result of the breach, the fact that
the amount of the damages is uncertain or difficult to
determine does not prevent recovery of the amount of
the damages if the amount of the damages can be established with reasonable certainty * * * * .
The trial court was able to determine from the
evidence the net earnings of the plant the first year
of operation and there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial court that the earnings
during the preceding 11 month period \\~ould have
been substantially the same. The cause \\Tas tried to
the court without a jury and, there being evidence to
sustain the findings of fact of a trial court, they are
binding and conclusive on this court."
In Caspery v. Moore, 70 P. 2d 224, 21 Cal. App. 694, it is
stated that evidence of profits both past and present is admissible in detern1ining the an1ount of prospective profits. In
DeWiner v. Nelson, 33 P. 2d 356, 54 Idaho 560, it was held
that the evidence that the plaintiff made daily computations
of costs and determined the average daily profit for feeding
each man \vas con1petent to prove loss of anticipated profits.
Relying upon the authorities cited by the defendant, it
is subtnitted that the evidence in this case does establish a rea-
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sonable formula or basis for computing the damages or that
the damages have been shown with reasonable certainty. If
exact certainty has not been established, the defendant cannot
be heard to complain. Again quoting from the leading case
of Story Parchment Company vs. Patterson Parchment Paper
Company, supra, decided by United States Supreme Court:
"To deny the injured party the right to recover any
actual damages in such cases, because they are of such
a nature v1hich cannot be thus certainly measured,
would be to enable parties to profit by, and speculate
upon, their own wrongs, encourage violence and invite
trepidation. Such is not, and cannot be, the law * * *
and the adoption of any arbitrary rule in such a case,
which will relieve the wrongdoer from any part of the
damages, and throw the loss upon the injured party,
would be little less than legalized robbery.
((Whatever of uncertainty there may be in this mode
of estimating damages, is an uncertainty caused by
the defendant's own wrongful act; and justice and
sound public policy alike require that he should bear
the risk of the uncertainty thus produced.''
The court also quoted from another case discussing this
question wherein it was stated:
((Certainty, it is true, would thus be attained; but it
would be the certainty of injustice."
POINT IV
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT H. WILLIAM
NALDER, SR. AND JR. WERE PARTNERS AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH OF THEIR NAMES
IS PROPER. (Defendant's Points I and III (d) .
From the time the pleadings were first filed, through the
first trial, and again on the retrial, the defandant did not
challenge that these plaintiffs were partners. Only on appeal
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is such issue raised. This procedure is used to entrap the trial
court and to reserve a ground for appeal. The Supreme Court
in the prior decision assumed that the plaintiffs were not, in
fact, partners and treated them separately in granting a reversal. Then again on the second trial the defendant conceded
that Nalder, Sr. and Jr. were partners. Concerning this issue,
the following took place at the time of retrial:
"MR. BUSHNELL: It's a question of a partnership
between two of them. We would like to show they jointly procured the money for setting up the physical plant.
MR. BOWEN: There is no issue on the partnership,
your Honor.
MR. BUSHNELL: Are you willing to admit, for
the purpose of this record, that Bill Nalder, Jr. and Mr.
Nalder, Sr., were partners in the instigation and raising
of these turkeys ?
MR. BOWEN: I have always so contended that they
were. Surely I'll admit it.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
MR. BUSHNELL: I won't spend any further time
on it." (Tr. 25 and 26).
Now again on appeal the defendant would assert the
parties should be treated separately.
There is no question but what Nalder, Sr. and Jr~, were
partners and the defendant so treated them. The evidence concerning this matter is as follows:
1. In Paragraph 7 of the answer and counterclaim, the

defendant alleged as follows:
''Defendant alleges that all of the real estate and
chattel mortgages referred to in said First Cause ~£
Action were made, executed and delivered by the satd

plaintiffr to the defe11dant as part of the fina~cing progran/ of the defendants who were engaged zn the turkey 1·ai.ring business.''
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2. The defendant company relied on the real estate mort-

gage as security on all obligations of all the plaintiffs. An
excerpt from the mortgage states:
((This mortgage shall secure all other sums due and
to become due from H. Willia1n Nalder, Sr. and Catherine Nalder, his wife, and H. William Nalder, Jr.
and Mrs. William Nalder, Jr., his wife, in favor of
Kellogg Sales Company."
3. Exhibit J-5 is a proposed forn1 of partnership agree~
ment for the formation of a partnership between Nalder, Sr.
and two of his sons. Since one of the sons v1ithdrew before
active operations, the agreement was not signed. However,
Nalder Sr. and Jr. testified that the terms of the agreement
were carried out between him and his father.
4. The title to the real property upon which a brooder
house was constructed was in both names, and mortgages
granted thereon were signed by all of the parties thereto (Ex.
J-4, 5, 6, 7).

The defendant maintains that the prior decision in this
case would prohibit the parties from showing the continuation
of the partnership after they were unable to procure financing
from the defendant and after Nalder Jr., in order to mitigate
damages, sought employment elsewhere. By the very terms
of the decision, it is clear that the court did not know what
the factual situation was in this regard. The court stated as
follows:
((The record is not clear as to whether the turkey raising activities in 1952, 195 3 and 1954 were a joint operation of Nalder, Sr. and Mrs. Nalder, or whether
limited to Nalder, Sr."
To clarify this point in the record, additional evidence
was submitted concerning the status of the parties at this time.
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The defendant has asserted that this amounts to a repudiation
of prior testimony. It is submitted that there is not one phase
of this testitnony which is inconsistent with any prior testimony
in either trial, but rather it is an amplification of an issue not
previously contested but made pertinent by virtue of the
Supreme Court's decision. It is claimed that Nalder, Jr.,
abandoned the raising of turkeys after 1952, and the defendant
further asserts that the prior decision v1ould prohibit any
evidence in this matter. Again quoting from that decision, it
is submitted that the holdings do not sustain the defendant's
contention. The court stated with reference to Nalder, Jr.:
ttl\Tor can he recover damages beyond the period when
he actually engaged in, or tried to engage in, the turkey
business."
This statement is again based upon the assumption that
Nalder, Sr. and Jr., were not, in fact, partners. That the defendant Nalder, Jr., would have continued raising turkeys is
supported by the following evidence:
1. The parties had invested approximately $20,000 in the
brooder house and equipment for a full-scale and continued
operation in the turkey business (Tr. 308).
2. The defendant Nalder Jr. had leased a 900-acre ranch
east of Bountiful, Utah, for a period of three years, expiring
in 1953 with the option to renew on the same terms for an
additional period of three years ( T r. 294, Ex. J 8) .
3. The plaintiffs had purchased a tractor and combine,
and planted grain on this ranch (Tr. 304).
4. In addition to the lease, the plaintiff was acquiring
one spike-tooth harrow, one three-bottom gang plow, one
grain drill, one six-foot tractor, and incidental tools (Tr.
294-5).
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5. The parties testified that the partnership had never
been terminated and during the three years in question Nalder,
Jr. assisted with the turkeys on each week-end and two or three
times during the week (Tr. 292-3, 311).
By law the plaintiffs are required to mitigate the damages.
Nalder, Jr., could not have refused to seek employtnent else·where and sought to charge that additional loss to the defendants. Since he was required and did seek employn1ent
elsewhere and has deducted the amount he received in their
claim for damages against the defendant, the defendant should
not be permitted to rely upon this fact to attempt to defeat
recovery as to Nalder, Jr.
The defendant next asserts that a distinction should be
made as to the parties on the real estate mortgage in the
instructions to the jury because of the highly penal nature of
the section pertaining to the release of real estate mortgages.
It should be pointed out that the court did not instruct the
jury concerning any penalty damages. This issue was decided
summarily in favor of the defendant. At the defendant's insistence and objections, the trial court refused to grant any
instructions concerning penalty damages or to even permit
the submission of a special interrogatory on the question of
v1hether failure to release the real estate mortgages would
amount to an independent concurring proximate cause. Since
no penalty was involved, this assertion by the defendant cannot
be maintained.
It is fundamental that partners cannot sue for their proportionate share of any amounts owing to a partnership. It is
equally fundamental that suit may be brought by all of the
partners or in the partnership name. In this case all of the
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partners are joined as parties plaintiff and no attempt has
been made by them or by the trial court to apportion the amount
of the judgment or among the parties plaintiff, except by stipulation and instruction to the jury Mrs. Nalder was eliminated
as a partner. By law all of the parties were required to be
parties plaintiff and therefore there was no reason for the
trial court to distinguish between Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr.
in computing the amount of damages. The Uniform Partnership Act states that the act of a partner is the act of the partnership. Section 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act, being Section
48-1-6 U.C.A. 1953, states as follows:
((Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership
Business.
(I) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for
the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner,
including the execution in the partnership name of any
instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual
way the business of the partnership of which he is a
member binds the partnership, unless the partner so
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership
in the particular matter, and the person with whom he
is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no
such authority.''
It is fundamental that inactive partners will be held
liable for the act of other partners and it therefore follows that
they are entitled to treat the act of a partner as the act of the
partnership in any determinations to amounts owing to the
partnership.
The record is clear that the parties had the facilities to
raise the turkeys claimed and in fact attempted to secure the
necessary financing to raise the number of turkeys for which
damages were awarded. It was only after they had been pre-
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vented from securing the necessary financing that Nalder, Jr.,
discontinued raising turkeys and sought other employment.
Any remuneration received from this other employment was
deducted in mitigation of damages. The defendant as the
wrongdoer should not be permitted to benefit from the fact
that it forced Nalder, Jr. from the turkey-raising business.
But for the conduct of the defendant, Nalder, Jr., with his
father would have raised turkeys during all of the years in
question. The law required the parties to mitigate damages
and should not now penalize them for so doing.
POINTV.
THE COURT PROPERLY:
(a) RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE EXHIBITS I-1, 1-2,
Q, R, & N 1-4 (Defendant's Point V)
(b) DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERPICT, OR FOR NEW TRIAL
(Defendant's Point IX)
(c) INSTRUCTED THE JURY AND REFUSED CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS (Defendant's Point X)
(d) DISALLOWED ITEMS ON DEFENDANT'S COST
BILL ON APPEAL (Defendant's Point XI)
THE COURT PROPERLY:
(a) RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE EXHIBITS I-1, I-2,
Q, R, AND N 1-4 (Defendant's Point V)
The defendant in its brief quoted only part of the testi·
mony concerning the foundation for the admissibility of Exhibits 1-1 and 2. After the testimony contained in defendant's
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brief, the counsel for the defendant asked the witness questions
on voir dire and established that the record was prepared by
the bookkeeper of the Lee Brown Company. It further appeared that said document was maintained as a part of the
regular business entries of that company (Tr. 36). As to
Exhibit I-2, it was likewise testified that it was a document
which was kept in the usual course of the business transactions
of the company (Tr. 37-9). It is respectfully submitted that
with such a foundation the exhibits were properly admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule as a business entry. However, the documents were not received at that time, but were
later admitted, the court stating as follows:
(The stipulati9n this morning was that those exhibits
may be received in evidence. They will be received"
Tr. 328).
As to Exhibits Q and R, they were processing sheets listing
the exact number of turkeys, grade, vveight, boxes, etc., the
original being given to the plaintiff and a copy maintained
by the processor. These documents were used to establish the
amount of processing charges paid by the defendant. He testified that these sheets were the documents used for settling
with Lee Brown, which is equivalent to his stating that he
paid the amount specified thereon for processing charges. Certain! y the plaintiff is qualified to state the amount of expenses
paid by him in connection with the raising of his turkeys.
t

As to Exhibits N 1-4, they merely amount to a tabulation
and computation of the an1ounts claimed by the plaintiffs. All
of the essential elements contained on each of those documents
were otherwise independently received as evidence as being
ledger sheets from the feed company's records, processing
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sheets, purchasing records, etc., and the personal testimony
of the plaintiffs (Tr. 331-3). Said documents were not relied
upon to establish the actual facts therein contained, but rather
as a summary of other facts properly admitted which would
enable the court and jury to follow the contentions of the
plaintiffs. That such a procedure is proper is supported by the
following cases:
((Where voluminous documents are a necessary part
of evidence in a cause, tabulation of the documents in
the form of charts and schedules may be introduced
for aid of the trier of the facts." Augustine v. Bowles,
149 F. 2d 93.
((Where books and documents are multifarious and
of a character rendering it difficult for the court or
jury to comprebend the facts without schedules, the
court may admit schedules verified by testimony of
persons making them." Michigan Bankers Association
vs. Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp., 264 N.W.
868, 274 Mich. 470.
It is further held that admission of maps and charts in
evidence ((is largely a matter of the trial court's discretion,
not to be disturbed by appellate courts, unless abuse of discretion is shown." Babcock vs. Gray, 107 P. 2d 846, 165 Ore.
398.
THE COURT PROPERLY:
(b) DEI\TIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT, OR FOR NEW TRIAL
(Defendant's Point IX)
The defendant, in arguing its Point IX, merely summarizes
its contentions and arguments as made in other points in the
brief; more particularly, a generalized statement is made that
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the defendant did not destroy the credit of the plaintiffs, that
the defendant had the right to maintain all its mortgages of
record, and there was no proof of proximate cause, demand,
or. lack of good faith, and that damages had not been shown,
but rather were speculative, uncertain and incompetent. It is
submitted that all of the foregoing were factual issues which
•
were properly presented to the jury with adequate and sufficient
instructions and, under proper rules of appellate practice, such
verdict must be sustained.
THE COURT PROPERLY:
(c) INSTRUCTED THE JURY AND REFUSED CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS (Defendant's Point X)
As to most of the instructions claimed to have been given
in error, the defendant makes a cross-reference to other places
in the brief where the factual or legal issue is argued. However,
in addition to these assignments of error, the defendant claims
that the most grievous error in this regard was the trial court's
granting of Instructions No. 16 and 18. Instruction No. 16
advises the jury that for them to find the defendant's conduct
was the proximate cause they need not find that it was the sole
proximate cause. Instruction No. 18 advises the jury that if
the wrongful acts of two or more persons were committed
independently and contributed concurrently as proximate
causes, each person could be liable. These instructions were
proper in form, having been copied from the California Approved Jury Instructions, being Instructions No. 104-A and
104- B. The main contention of the defendant seems to be that
the instructions were not applicable to the facts of this case.
The defendant states (tthat there was no evidence of any wrong
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or act committed by a third party which, acting concurrently
with the acts of defendant, jointly caused damages to plaintiffs. (Page 56).
At the time of trial, the defendant placed considerable
emphasis on the fact that there were numerous unreleased
household-type chattel mortgages which like,vise may have
contributed to the denial of the application made by the plaintiffs. Not only by cross-examination were these factors greatly
emphasized (Tr. 157-170) but counsel for the defendant read
into the record some 18 such mortgages (Tr. 472-5). The
various credit men from General Mills and Ralston-Purina,
in addition to Mr. Aust, the credit manager for the defendant,
stated that unreleased household chattel mortgages would not
necessarily prohibit the approval of applications, since they
did not purport to give a lien on after acquired turkeys. In
fact, the defendant had financed the plaintiffs for three years
during which time most of these chattel mortgages were still
of record. Nevertheless, the defendant, having raised the
issue of the conduct of other persons in failing to have mortgages released, presented a factual issue upon which the court
was required to instruct the jury. That is to say, the issue had
been raised as to what effect should be given to the failure
of the H. A. Company to release its chattel mortgages even
though they had been paid, as testified by a representative
of that company (Tr. 274-281). The instructions as given
properly instructed the jury that if the conduct of the defendant
was a proximate cause, being a substantial factor contributing
to the damage of the plaintiffs, the fact that other persons
or causes may also have been a contributing factor would not
relieve the defendant from liability. The defendant is not

73
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stating the true facts when it states in its brief on Page 59,
CCThere is absolutely no evidence of any wrong committed
by any third party." Such evidence was clearly introduced and
presented by the defendant.
Objection was also made to Instruction No. 19 which stated
that notice to Schinker and Aust of a demand for release of
the mortgages was notice to the defendant. No contention
was made by the defendant that said agents did not have
authority to at least receive demands for release of mortgages.
Rather, the defendant maintained that they had no authority
to release the mortgages. This was not the issue presented by
Instruction No. 19. Rather, it was limited to the effect that such
agents could receive demands for release of mortgages and
convey them to a representative of the company having authority to either release or refuse to release said mortgages. The
record shows that this procedure was, in fact, followed and
Mrs. Schinker advised Mr. Williams that the release of the
mortgages had been discussed and requested advice from him
as to whether releases should be granted. She was advised by
Mr. Williams that the mortgages were not to be released (Tr.

342).
The defendant complains because the jury was not instructed that the filing of the suit by the plaintiffs created no
inference that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. It is
implicit in the instructions as a whole that such was the case
and there can be no complaint of prejudicial error by the court's
refusal to grant such instructions.
The other claimed errors in the giving or refusing to give
certain instructions are argued in other points in both briefs.
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THE COURT PROPERLY:
(d) DISALLOWED ITEMS ON DEFENDANT'S COST
BILL ON APPEAL (Defendant's Point XI)
The defendant argues that it was error for the trial court,
in retaxing costs, to disallow a premium of $682.84 paid for
a supersedeas bond. Rule 73 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that the appellant, if he so desires 1 may present
to the court for its approval a supersedeas bond. It will be
noted that this is only permissive, and may be resorted to if
the appellant so desires. It is not required, nor is it mandatory,
for the purpose of perfecting the appeal.
In an annotation entitled ((Taxable Costs and Disbursements as Including Premiums Paid on Bonds Incident to Steps
Taken in Action," 81 A.L.R. 1532, it is stated as follows:
((At common law, costs were unknown, were not
recoverable, and were not adjudged in the judgment of
the court. It is said to be a general rule that common law
courts have no inherent power to award costs, which
can be granted to either party in any cause or proceeding only by virtue of express statutory authority;
and that for courts of law to allow or apportion costs, it
is necessary to point to some specific provision of the
statute giving the right. And such statutory provisions
are to be construed strictly. 7 R.C.L. 781, 782.
((The practice of employing surety companies to furnish bonds in judicial proceedings is of comparatively
recent origin. In most instances the courts were disinclined to hold that the premiums paid for such bonds
were included in the language of a general statute
providing for the taxation as costs of the disbursements
necessarily incurred in the action."
In 14 Am. Jur. 36, Costs, Section 60, Premiums on Bonds,

it is stated:
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'(The general rule seems to be that in the absence of
statutory authority, the premium paid for a bond given
in a pending action may not be taxed as costs therein."
Rule 54 (d) ( 3) and the case cited by the defendant do
not specifically discuss the awarding of premiums on bonds as
costs. Neither Rule 54-3 (d) discussing the awarding of costs
on appeal nor Rule 73 (d) specifically dealing with supersedeas
bonds specify that premiums may be awarded as taxable costs.
Consequent!y, in view of the foregoing law, it would appear
that costs for said premium may not be taxed against the
plaintiffs. The bond was procured for the convenience of the
defendant and was not required to perfect the appeal.

CROSS-APPEAL
POINT VI. THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE
JURY SHOULD BE DOUBLED PURSUANT TO SECTION
.57-3-.8, U.C.A. 1953.
POINT VII. THE COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM.
POINT VI-ARGUMENT
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY SHOULD
BE DOUBLED PURSUANT TlO SECTION 53-3-8, U.C.A.
1953.
In the decision on the prior appeal, the Supreme Court
stated as follows:
((One whose credit is damaged by the wrongful failure to release both real estate and chattel mortgages
may, in exceptional cases, be able to satisfactorily prove
elements of damages proximately caused by a particular
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unreleased mortgage. In such case, damages should be
awarded under the particular statute applicable."
Having this statement in mind, the plaintiff requested
the court to give the following instruction:
Requested Instruction No. 11
!(If, adhering to the Court's instruction, you find that
the defendant wrongfully failed to release real estate
mortgages as contrasted to chattel mortgages and such
failure in and of itself was a proximate cause of damage, then you are instructed to return a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff in double the amount of actual damages
determined by you to have been caused by such failure.
If you do not find that such a failure to release real
estate mortgages alone amounted to a proximate cause
of damages but that such failure along with a wrongful
failure to release chattel mortgages jointly were a
proximate cause of damage, then you are instructed to
return a verdict for the plaintiff for actual damages
sustained, plus $50.00 punitive damages" (R. 42).
Without giving effect to the prior decision as quoted
above, the defendant prevailed upon the trial court that said
instruction should be refused, relying upon this additional
statement made by the Supreme Court in the prior decision:
((The court should apply the rule that when either
of two statutory penalties is equally applicable to
a given set of facts, the lesser of such penalties must
be applied."
It is submitted that reliance upon this statement alone,
without considering the context in which it was stated, gives
an erroneous interpretation to the court's prior decision. After
the court had refused to give Instruction No. 11, the plaintiffs
requested the submission of a special interrogatory as contained
in requested Instruction 8 (R. 39). The interrogatory to be
answered, as requested in said instruction, was as follows:
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ctDid the defendant wrongfully fail to release real
estate mortgages, which failure proximately damaged
the plaintiffs?"
By such answer, either the trial court or the Supreme Court
would have been in a position to rule as a matter of law whether
double damages should be applied. Again the defendant
prevailed upon the trial court that such an answer was not
required in view of the Supreme Court's prior decision. It is
submitted that this was error and an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court. If the jury had answered the interrogatory
in the negative, there would have been no purpose for any
further argument. If they had answered the interrogatory in
the affirmative, the issue would be squarely presented as to
the earlier decision; and, since the jury would have found the
factual issue that failure to release the real estate mortgage
was also a proximate cause in and of itself, the court would
be in a position to assess the damages. Since the defendant
prevented a determination on this factual issue and the jury
found that failure to release both real estate and chattel
mortgages were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damage,
it now must be presumed that failure to release real estate
mortgages was also a proximate cause and, therefore, damages
must be doubled.
There is no support for the court's statement:
nThe Court should apply the rule that when either
of two statutory penalties is equally applicable to a
given set of facts, the lesser of such penalties must be
applied."
Attempt to find authority supporting such a statement has
been unsuccessful. The statement is that when either of two
statutory penalties is equally applicable. It would appear
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that if either statutory penalty is equally applicable, then
the Court should not disregard legislative intent and the jury
should be free to apply either or both penalties as they may
find the issues. If there is uncertainty as to whether failure
to release the real estate mortgages was an independent concurring cause, then there would be some justification for applying the lesser of the two penalties. Stating it differently, if
failure to release the real estate mortgages was not in and of
itself sufficient to cause the damages alleged but that failure
to release such mortgages together with failure to release
chattel mortgages operated as concurrent causes, the lesser
penalty should be applied; but if the jury concludes that either
one acting separately or independently was sufficient to cause
the damages and therefore were ((equally applicable" there
does not appear to be any authority requiring application of
the lesser of the two penalties.
Statutes imposing penalties serve a proper and legitimate
purpose well within the province of the legislature to enact
as is stated in 23 Am. Jur. 627, as follows:
((The statutes of nearly every state of the Union
provide for the increase of damage where the injury
complained of results from the neglect of duties imposed for the better security of life and property, and
make that increase in many cases double and in some
cases treble and even quadruple the actual damages.
Experience favors this legislation as the most efficient
mode of preventing, with the least inconvenienc~, the
commission of in juries. The decisions of the htghest
courts have affirmed the validity of such legislation."
By holding that where the statutory penalties are equally
applicable the lesser must be applied, this court abrogates legislative enactments in contravention of prior cases recognizing a
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contrary rule of construction. In Chatwin vs. Terry, 107 U.
340, 153 P. 2d 941, it is stated:
((In construing statutes such as here it is the duty of
this Court to give meaning to each and to reconcile
them in such a manner as to carry out the reasonable
and practical intention of the legislature."
In Smith vs. American Packing and Provision Company,
102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d 951, it is stated:
('In Cuckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 61
Utah 559, 216 P. 684, 685, this court said: (But it is
not to be presumed that the legislature would enact a
vain and meaningless statute. We conceive it to be our
duty, if possible, to adopt that interpretation which
will give effect to each provision and harmonize them
with each other, so that neither will be meaningless."
The verdict of the jury assessing damages should be
doubled as required by the legislature.
POINT VII. THE COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM.
The defendant counterclaimed for the amount owing representing the deficiency for 1949 in addition to attorneys' fees
as specified in the promissory note. At no time was there any
issue or contest concerning the obligation for the deficiency
to the defendants. The extended trial was concerned solely
with the items alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. Nevertheless, the defendant called Mr. Quinney to testify concerning
reasonable attorneys' fees to be awarded in the matter, and
Mr. Quinney's testimony was based upon the extended trial
when he stated that a fee of $750 was not nearly adequate
and would not be the only fee charged in the matter (Tr. 43 7) ·
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Since there was no issue as to the amount owing for the
1949 deficiency and therefore no litigation was involved concerning said amount, and since as determined by the jury the
defendants in fact owed the plaintiffs more than the amount
of the counterclaim, it is submitted that the defendant is not
entitled to an award of $750 for attorneys' fees in this case.
In a recent annotation entitled (<Recovery of Attorneys'
Fees Provided for in Bill, Note, or Similar Evidence of Indebtedness as Affected by Opposing Recovery," 41 A.L.R. 2d
677, a summary of the law is stated as follows:
(<While there is some divergence of opinion, the
majority of the courts which have weighed the question
agree that where the defendant in an action on a note
or similar evidence of indebtedness containing a provision for the payment of attorney's fees, recovers on
a counterclaim, or the like, in an amount in excess of
the amount due on the note for principal and interest,
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover such fees. * * * *
This rule appears to be founded on the reasoning that,
the holder of the note being indebted to the defendant
maker in a greater amount than the sum due on the
note, the note is substantially paid * * * * "
Based upon the foregoing authority, the awarding of attorneys' fees to the defendant on its counterclaim cannot be
sustained.
~ONCLUSION

This appeal is predicated primarily upon a factual dispute.
The plaintiffs having been awarded a verdict by the jury, is
entitled to have this court review the record to determine if
there is competent evidence to support the findings of the
jury. Not only is there sufficient, competent evidence to sustain

81
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that determination; but rather, evidence would have to be
ignored to rule as a matter of law that all reasonable persons
would conclude that the plaintiffs have not sustained their
case. The duty to release mortgages upon satisfaction is specified by the Legislature. The jury found that all of the mortgages, except the last real estate mortgage, had been satisfied
either by payment or by express merger into said mortgage.
The existence of unreleased mortgages, totalling $107,401.92
as contrasted to a mortgage of $6,550.12, clearly supports a
finding that plaintiffs' credit rating was so impaired that they
could not secure financing to enable them to continue in their
chosen business. Their maximum investment and endeavor
was rendered useless. The jury's determination of damages
is based upon actual experience not usually found in a loss
of profits case. Since 1884 the law in Utah has provided that
a defendant who fails to release a mortgage after it has been
satisfied must pay double lhe actual damages caused by such
failure. A legal wrong has been done to plaintiffs. The possible magnitude of such wrong was recognized by the legislature
when it set out the penalty of double damages. Irrespective
of the statute, punitive damages may be awarded where a
v.rrongful act is done with a bad motive or with negligence
amounting to positive misconduct, or in a manner evidencing
a willful disregard of the rights of others. The anguish suffered
by plaintiffs in their vain attempt to continue in their chosen
business cannot be put aside lightly. They were but puppets
in the hands of defendant who held the purse strings; and who,
in that position of power, manifested a conscious disregard
of the rights of the plaintiffs, and a reckless indifference to
the consequences of their acts. Defendant's action was so willful

82
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and done with such wanton disregard that an award of punitive
damages is more than justified.
The fundamental issue is whether the defendant company
may curtail a farmer's ability to remain in business. Does the
defendant company have the right to coerce payments by lightly
disregarding its statutory duties, with full knowledge that
such business practices make it impossible for the farmer to
earn a livelihood in a business of his own choice? The Legislature did not so intend; the jury did not so find. This Court
should not nullify that legislative intent nor overthrow that
factual determination. Not only should the jury's verdict be
affirmed, but in addition the amount of that verdict should be
doubled and the award of attorneys' fees on defendant's
counterclaim should be disallowed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAN S. BUSHNELL
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Respondents
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